Examination Essay Questions - Feburary 2003
MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION I - FEBRUARY 2003
QUESTION I was a "Multistate Performance Test" (MPT) and is not answered
MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION II - FEBRUARY 2003
1. What factors should be considered in evaluating the request? What position should you take? Why?
Your assignment is to advise Tommy in the exercise of his fiduciary duty as trustee.
Because Tommy is currently serving, and the trust was established under Danny’s will, there can be no doubt about the validity of the trust: it was “established” by the probate court as part of the process of settling Danny’s probate estate, and its administration is subject to the ongoing jurisdiction of the probate court for the district where Danny resided at the time of his death. That may or may not have been in Addison County, the residence of Erin and Fred.
In analyzing the request of Erin and Fred, the current beneficiaries, the main issue is to determine the intent of Danny, the testator, as reflected in the terms of his will, and whether there remains to be accomplished a material purpose of the trust. Under the statement of facts as presented, because the youngest child has graduated from college and entered the job market, and because under the terms of the will Tommy is granted the discretion to determine when that purpose has been accomplished, the education condition of the trust probably has been satisfied. However, you might be concerned with possible ambiguities in the will, which might raise issues such as the possibility that Erin and Fred might have more children (natural or adopted), or that the current children may seek later to continue their education at the graduate level or as a part of a career change.
On behalf of Tommy, you should consider whether termination of the trust would be in accordance with Tommy’s fiduciary duty to all of the trust’s beneficiaries, present and future, and whether the distribution of the entire trust corpus at one time would be in furtherance of Tommy’s intention. It may be necessary to ascertain more facts to properly evaluate the request (e.g. , the size of the trust, the amount of income it generates, the costs of administration, other resources that may or may not be available to Erin and Fred, their current circumstances and financial situation. What financial issues facing Erin and Fred led to the request? Has their situation changed drastically since the time that the will was signed? Did Danny intend that the trust be a spendthrift and/or support trust?)
Equally as important is to determine whether the consents of Erin’s and Fred’s children were fully informed (do they need their own counsel?), and whether they are legally sufficient. Your legal analysis on behalf of Tommy should include consideration of whether the trust can be terminated even with the consent of all persons currently interested. Have the rights of Erin and Fred’s children vested? What of the possibility that they might have other or future children? Does the trust as drafted violate the Rule Against Perpetuities and, if so, what are the implications?
Although the English and minority rules might permit distribution with the informed consent of all persons currently interested in the trust, the best advice to Tommy probably is to deny the request, because one of Danny’s major goals – lifetime support of Erin and Fred – remains to be accomplished. The issue of other or future-born issue also raises the possibility of liability of Tommy to those persons.
2. What concerns arise if Tommy Trustee complies? If he agrees with the request, how should he proceed?
If the decision is to grant the request, Tommy should be counseled to file a petition or motion to terminate the trust with the probate court that has jurisdiction over the trust. The consents of all interested persons should be filed, and/or notice given to any who do not consent, in accordance with the Vermont Rule of Probate Procedure. If the Court grants the petition, a final account would have to be filed and income tax clearances would have to be obtained from the Vermont Department of Taxes. The Court then would issue an order of distribution. The assets then could be distributed, receipts obtained, and a closing report filed. As part of the process, and perhaps included with the consents to be filed, Tommy would be well advised to obtain releases from all of the interested persons.
3. If he refuses to comply, what is Erin and Fred’s recourse? What avenues are available to them?
If Tommy refuses the request, based on your advice or otherwise, the process to be followed by Erin and Fred in contesting that decision would be similar: through their own counsel, they could file a motion to terminate the trust, with notice to be given to the Trustee and the other interested parties. In the alternative, Fred and Erin could file a petition in Probate Court to remove Tommy as the trustee and to replace him with another trustee, who might be more willing to terminate the trust as they have requested. In order to prevail on that claim, however, Erin and Fred would have to prove that Tommy had breached his fiduciary duties, which does not appear to have much likelihood of success given the facts of this case and the discretion vested in Tommy by the terms of the will.
Either party could appeal the ruling of the
Probate Court to the Superior Court in the County in which it is located,
and then to the Supreme Court.
MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION III - FEBRUARY 2003
1. Identify the court or courts in which you could file a suit against Durable Locomotives, and state the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction in each court.
Provided he could establish personal jurisdiction over Durable Locomotives, see question 3, below, Paul could file a suit in the Orleans Superior Court. Vermont's court of general jurisdiction, the appropriate forum for civil claims such as this one, is the Superior Court. 4 V.S.A. § 113. Venue lies in a county in which either party resides, in this case Orleans County. 12 V.S.A. § 402.
Alternatively, if Durable Locomotives is subject to personal jurisdiction in Vermont, Paul could file a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, or, if not, in the appropriate California district. The federal court has jurisdiction over cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this case, the parties are citizens of different states, and the matter in controversy is arguably greater than $75,000, so the case is subject to federal jurisdiction.
Venue within the federal court system lies in any district where the defendant resides (since Durable Locomotives is a corporation, it is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced), or in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Paul could also consider filing suit in California state court.
2. What tort claim(s) could Paul make against Durable Locomotives, and what would you have to prove in order to prevail?
The two primary tort claims Paul could make against Durable Locomotives are claims for (A) ordinary negligence, and (B) strict products liability.
A. Durable Locomotives may be liable for negligence if Paul can establish (1) that Durable Locomotives owed him a legal duty to protect him from an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) that Durable Locomotives breached that duty; (3) that Durable Locomotive's conduct was the proximate cause of his injuries; and (4) that Paul suffered actual damage. Knight v. Rower, 170 Vt. 96, 102 (1999).
B. Durable Locomotives may be strictly liable pursuant to the doctrine of strict products liability if Paul can establish that Durable Locomotives, as manufacturer, sold a product in defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, and that that product, the Gold Rush Locomotive engine, reached Paul without undergoing substantial change. Paquette v. Deere and Company, 168 Vt. 258, 260 (1998). As in an ordinary negligence claim, Paul would also have to establish that his damages were proximately caused by the defective condition of the Gold Rush Locomotive. In this case, Paul's claim is most likely to rest on a design defect inherent in the Gold Rush Locomotive engines, rather than a manufacturing defect concerning his particular engine. Paul could also focus on Durable Locomotives' failure to warn in connection with this claim.
3. What procedural and substantive affirmative defenses should you anticipate, and how would you respond to each?
Durable Locomotives' potential defenses include the following: (A) lack of personal jurisdiction, (B) statute of limitations, and (C) assumption of risk/comparative negligence. In addition, if Paul files in state court, Durable Locomotives may seek to remove the case to federal court.
A. Personal jurisdiction:
Durable Locomotives may argue that Vermont courts lack personal jurisdiction over Durable Locomotives.
Vermont's long-arm statute, 12 V.S.A. section 913(b) confers jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Northern Aircraft, Inc. v. Reed, 154 Vt. 36, 40 (1990). Under the Due Process Clause, a state court may assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), Dall v. Kaylor, 163 Vt. 274 (1995). In determining what contacts are sufficient to support personal jurisdiction, the Vermont Supreme Court has considered whether a defendant is in the business of selling its products nationwide, including in Vermont and the extent to which the seller initiated a sale with a Vermont resident, by advertising in a national market that included Vermont.
In support of Paul's claim, then, I would argue that to the extent that Durable Locomotives heavily promoted its product in a national market that included Vermont, and then sold its product directly to a Vermont resident– even shipping it to Vermont– it is subject to the jurisdiction of Vermont's courts.
B. Statute of Limitations
Durable Locomotives may argue that Paul's tort claims are barred by the statute of limitations, which is three years for claims for injuries to the person suffered by the act or default of another person. 12 V.S.A. § 512. The locomotive exploded, and Paul suffered his injury, on January 11, 2000. Insofar as more than three years have passed since that date, Durable Locomotives would argue, the statute has run.
In support of Paul's claim, I would argue that the three year statute of limitations for injuries to the person is subject to the discovery rule. That is, the cause of action is deemed to accrue "as of the date of the discovery of the injury." 12 V.S.A. § 512. In particular, the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff should have discovered (1) the injury, (2) its cause, and (3) the existence of a cause of action. Soutiere v. Betzdearborn, Inc., 189 F.Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt. 2002). In this case, then, I would argue that the limitations period did not start to run until Paul discovered the true nature and extent of his injury following the July, 2001 x-ray. Alternatively, if Paul learned of the faulty welding material within three years of suit, I might argue that the limitations period didn't start to run until after he learned, by reading the article in "Making Tracks," of the design defect that caused the locomotive to explode.
C. Comparative Negligence/Assumption of Risk
In connection with both the negligence claim and the strict products liability claim, Durable Locomotives may argue that Paul assumed the risk of such an injury by operating multiple trains at once, and that his conduct in running multiple trains, and in failing to properly operate the switches to prevent the collision that gave rise to his damages, amounted to negligence on Paul's part.
In support of Paul's negligence claim, I would note that any contributory or comparative negligence on his part will not bar recovery if his negligence was not greater than the negligence of Durable Locomotives. In other words, if Paul's negligence was not more than 50% responsible for his injuries, his negligence claim will not be barred. However, his damages may be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to him. The task of apportionment of responsibility will fall to the factfinder– either the judge or, if a jury trial, the jury.
Likewise, with respect to Paul's strict products liability claim, I would argue that comparative liability principles likely apply, and that any claimed product-misuse or negligence on his part would not necessarily bar his recovery, although it might reduce his damages as set forth above. Webb v. Navistar International Transportation Corporation, 166 Vt. 119, 125-133 (1997).
4. Discuss the types of damages you would seek from Durable Locomotive as compensation for Paul, and the general requirements of each.
If Paul prevails on his negligence or products liability claim, he must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the nature and extent of his damages. He must show that his damages are the direct, necessary and probable result of Durable Locomotives' actions. Callan v. Hackett, 170 Vt. 609 (2000).
Those damages flowing from the complications arising from Paul's hand surgery would likely be included in the overall damages, whether or not they resulted from medical negligence. (Whether or not the negligence of a third person amounts to a new and independent force or agency breaking the chain of causal connection between the original wrong and the ultimate result turns on whether such negligence was something the tortfeasor had a duty to anticipate. Paton v. Sawyer, 134 Vt. 598, 601 (1977). Ordinary medical negligence does not typically constitute such an intervening cause.)
Although Paul would be entitled to compensation for all direct and natural consequences of his injury, he would have an obligation to mitigate his damages. Schnabel v. Nordic Toyota, Inc., 168 Vt. 354, 361 (1998).
Paul's damages should include:
(1) compensation for past medical expenses, whether or not paid by a third-party payer such as a health insurer (see, for example, Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 157 Vt. 477, 485 (1991).
(2) compensation for anticipated future medical expenses, to the extent the amount of such expenses can be established without undue speculation;
(3) compensation for lost wages to date;
(4) compensation for the loss of his future earning capacity, taking into account his obligation to mitigate his damages by seeking other employment;
(5) compensation for past pain and suffering, loss of recreational and other opportunities flowing from the loss of use of his hand, and emotional distress; and(6) compensation for future pain and suffering, loss of recreational and other opportunities flowing from the use of his hand, and emotional distress arising from the permanent injury he has sustained.
MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION IV - FEBRUARY 2003
1. Who is entitled to receive notice and service of the foreclosure complaint and why?
The foreclosure complaint must name as defendants all parties in interest. V.R.C.P. 80.1. Parties in interest include mortgagors, other mortgagees, lienholders, and tenants in possession. Id.; see also 12 V.S.A. § 4523(c). Therefore, all of the following should receive notice and service of the foreclosure complaint: Phillip and Patience, the mortgagors; Mobile Home Bank, another mortgagee; Charlie Carpenter, who has a lien on the property; the IRS, which also has a lien; and Buster, who is a tenant residing at the property. The facts of this question raise some doubt as to whether Mobile Home Bank is entitled to notice and service, since MHB did not record its interest in the land records. However, because Home Lenders has constructive notice of MHB’s interest, the better course is to name MHB as a defendant and provide it with notice and service.
2. Describe the steps necessary to foreclose on the real property owned by Phillip and Patience.
a. Home Lenders must file a complaint for foreclosure in the superior court for the county where the land is located. 12 V.S.A. § 4523(a). As described above, the complaint must name all parties in interest as defendants. The complaint must identify the mortgagor and mortgagee, provide all relevant information about the mortgage and underlying debt, and advise the defendants of the need to appear and their right of redemption.
b. The complaint must be served on the defendants as provided in Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, V.R.C.P. 80.1, and filed in the town clerk’s office, 12 V.S.A. § 4523(b). A tenant may be served by first class mail. 12 V.S.A. V.S.A. § 4523(c)(1).
c. The proceedings in superior court are expedited. To avoid a default, defendants must file a verified answer or answer supported by affidavits. If defendants file such an answer, the plaintiffs may move for summary judgment. If defendants fail to file such an answer, the court enters a default. V.R.C.P. 80.1(c).
d. Once a default has entered or the court has adjudicated the claims, if the parties do not agree on the amount due, the clerk must take an accounting and find the amount of principal, interest to date, and costs due. V.R.C.P. 80.1(f).
e. The plaintiff must prepare and serve a form of judgment on all defendants who have appeared, together with a copy of any accounting. V.R.C.P. 80.1(g). The judgment order should set forth the time for redemption, which is six months or such shorter time as the court orders. 12 V.S.A. § 4528. Since the IRS is a lienholder, the redemption period should be the full six months.
f. The court should also provide for foreclosure by sale, if appropriate. V.R.C.P. 80.1(h). The court approves and signs the judgment order and the clerk enters it.
g. During the time of redemption the mortgagees may redeem the property and avoid foreclosure by paying the amount due into court.
h. If foreclosure by sale is authorized, the property may be sold when the redemption period expires. V.R.C.P. 80.1(h).
When the property is sold, the proceeds go first to the plaintiffs. If the proceeds exceed the amount due the plaintiff, the court shall provide for payment of the surplus to the other defendants in the order of priority of their liens and to the defendant mortgagor. If there is a deficiency, the court may assess a judgment against the mortgagor for that amount. V.R.C.P. 80.1(j).
The court enters an order of confirmation showing the names of all persons whose interests in the property is foreclosed, the name of the person to whom title is transferred, the names of any lienholders whose liens remain against the property, and a legal description of the property. V.R.C.P. 80.1(k).
3. What are the respective rights of all involved parties in:
a. the mobile home. The key issue with respect to the mobile home is whether it has become a “fixture” on the real property. Under the facts given, the mobile home probably has become a fixture, because it has been “set up,” the wheels have been removed and the home has been connected to the water and septic systems. These steps are probably sufficient to indicate an intent on the part of Phillip & Patience to make the mobile home part of the real property. The Vermont Supreme Court held in Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Godin, 137 Vt. 39 (1979), that a mobile home became a fixture when it was installed on the property, a foundation and steps were added, the septic system was connected, and the foundation was encased in siding. Nonetheless, an argument could be made that the water and septic hook ups are not sufficient to make the mobile home a fixture, and that Phillip and Patience took no other actions to permanently attach the mobile home to the property (such as constructing a foundation).
If the mobile home is a fixture, then the mobile home is now subject to the mortgage interest held by Home Lenders and to the other liens on the real property held by the IRS and Charlie Carpenter. Although Mobile Home Bank’s security attached before Home Lenders issued the mortgage to Phillip and Patience, Mobile Home Bank did not record a fixture filing in the land records. Under the UCC, the parties with an interest in the real property take priority over Mobile Home Bank’s security interest in the fixture. 9 V.S.A. § 9-334. Home Lenders’ knowledge that the mobile home was “mortgaged” does not affect the priority.
If the mobile home is not a fixture, then Mobile Home Bank is the only party, other than Phillip and Patience, that has an interest in the mobile home. Mobile Home Bank has a perfected security interest in the home. MHB did not have to file a financing statement to perfect its interest; a purchase money interest in consumer goods is perfected at the time of attachment under the UCC. 9A V.S.A. § 9-309(1). MHB’s interest in the mobile home will not be affected by the mortgage proceedings. MHB can pursue its own remedies under the UCC.
b. the real property. Home Lenders has priority because it has a properly recorded purchase money mortgage interest in the property.
The IRS lien does not take priority over Home Lender’s purchase money mortgage, 26 U.S.C. § 6323, even though the IRS filed a notice of its lien in the land records first. The question does not give enough information to establish conclusively the relative priority of the IRS and Charlie Carpenter. As explained below, it is not clear whether Charlie Carpenter properly perfected his lien. Under some circumstances, a perfected mechanics’ lien takes priority over an IRS tax lien. 26 U.S.C. § 6323. The lien must arise out of repairs or improvements to an owner-occupied personal residence and the underlying contract cannot exceed $5000. Id. It is possible that Charlie Carpenter’s lien has priority over the IRS lien.
Charlie Carpenter has a lien against the real property because he filed the lien within 120 days of the time payment was due for his work. 9 V.S.A. § 1921. It is not clear from the question, however, whether Charlie Carpenter has perfected his lien. To perfect the lien, he had to file suit, get an attachment approved, and have it recorded in the land records within 90 days of the original filing. If Charlie’s lien is perfected, his interest is still junior to Home Lenders, because the mortgage was recorded prior to his lien. Id. As discussed above, the relative priority of the IRS and Charlie Carpenter is not clear. Charlie Carpenter’s interest is senior to Mobile Home Bank because Mobile Home Bank did not record a fixture filing in the land records before he recorded his lien.
If the mobile home is deemed a fixture, Mobile Home Bank still has an interest in the mobile home, so if there is any money left after paying the senior lienholders, it would receive the surplus to the extent of its claim.
If any money is left over after the creditors are satisfied, it would go to Phillip and Patience.
c. the contents of the mobile home. If the mobile home itself is deemed a fixture, then some of the contents, such as appliances that are affixed in some permanent manner, will likely also be deemed fixtures. Any fixtures are subject to liens on the real estate held by Home Lenders, the IRS, and Charlie Carpenter.
The Mobile Home Bank may have a perfected security interest in the contents of the mobile home that were purchased with the money that the Bank loaned to Phillip and Patience. The Bank’s purchase money security interest perfected when it attached. 9A V.S.A. § 9-309(1). It is not clear, however, whether the Bank loaned Phillip and Patience the money to purchase the furniture and furnishings of the mobile home or simply used those items to secure its interest in the mobile home. If the Bank does not have a purchase money security interest, then its interest is not perfected because it did not file a financing statement. Either way, the Bank may pursue its remedies under the UCC against this collateral. Whether or not its security interest is perfected, the Bank may still enforce its interest against Phillip and Patience.
On the facts of the
question, it does not appear that the IRS has filed a lien against Phillip’s
MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION V - FEBRUARY 2003
The question concerns the admissibility of statements made in the context of settlement negotiations. Statements made in two different contexts are at issue.
The first statements were made in the mediation session in early January of 2002. One offered statement is that Shareholders offered to settle their case for $10 Million. The other offered statement is that Insurer declined, but offered to pay $ 5 Million.
The second statements were made outside of any mediation proceeding, after the judgment was entered, on March 15, 2002. The substance of this statement is that Insurer offered to settle for $10 Million in a failed attempt to resurrect the proposal that it had earlier rejected at mediation.
There is no privilege for statements made in mediation. Lawson v. Brown's Day Care Center, __ Vt. __, 776 A. 2d 390, 2001 Vt. Lexis 151 (April 16, 2001). Neither the statements made in mediation nor those made outside of mediation are covered by a recognized privilege, and, therefore, the question as to whether they may be admitted is determined by the rules of admissibility, rather than the rules relating to privileges
Rule 408 of the Vermont Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of offering to compromise a claim which is disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability, or to prove the invalidity of the claim.
Considering, first, statements made in mediation, they are not offered to prove that Accounting Firm or Insurer were liable for plaintiff's claim. No inference is to be made that the $5 Million settlement response shows the defendants knew they would be found liable. Nor are these statements offered to show that the plaintiffs' $300 Million claim was invalid. No inference is to be drawn from the fact that plaintiffs were willing to settle their case for $10 Million. These statements are offered to show that the case could have been settled at that point in time, for a specified amount ($10 Million). Plaintiffs must prove that the underlying case could have been settled for an amount that the insurer was obliged to pay, in order to show that Insurer is liable in this case for failing to honor its contract of insurance. Rule 408 expressly states that it does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for another purpose, as is the case here. Since the mediation settlement discussions are not offered to show that Accounting Firm or Insurer admitted liability, but instead is offered only to show that Insurer had the opportunity to settle the case for the specified ($10 Million) amount, these statements may be admitted into evidence.
The opposite result pertains to the post-judgment (March 15, 2002) statement, to the effect that Insurer attempted to resurrect the earlier settlement proposal by offering to pay $10 Million. The willingness of Insurer to pay $10 Million at that point has no probative value, except, potentially, to show that Insurer has tacitly or otherwise admitted that the second insurance policy applies. That is one of the key issues before the court in the present case (Accounting Firm v. Insurer); i.e. whether Insurer is also liable under the second insurance policy. This statement is not offered for any other purpose. Therefore, it is an inadmissible offer to compromise, as provided in Rule 408, and should be excluded from evidence.
411 should be briefly considered. That
Rule makes inadmissible evidence as to whether a person was or was not insured,
but only upon the issue of whether the person acted wrongfully. Hence, in the underlying action in which
Shareholders sued the Accounting Firm, evidence as to whether Accounting Firm
had insurance would have been properly excluded under Rule 411. But in the present action, (Accounting Firm
v. Insurer) the issue is whether Insurer has fulfilled its obligations under
its insurance contract. This case
concerns whether the Insurer honored its insurance contract, and Rule 411 does
not in this context require exclusion of all evidence of the very contract that
is at issue.
MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION VI - FEBRUARY 2003
Pat does have standing to challenge the Department’s rescission of the new rule. The Vermont Supreme Court held in In re Diel, 158 Vt. 549 (1992), that because ANFC recipients use their benefits to meet their day to day living expenses, they suffer a legal injury when the Department seeks to rescind a benefit increase. This legal injury is sufficient to make Pat “aggrieved” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedures Act, (APA). The APA, at 3 V.S.A. §801 et seq, provides that a person who is aggrieved by agency action may challenge the decision of the agency. In coming to this conclusion the Vermont Supreme Court also recognized the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg established that welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement that cannot be terminated without due process.
In order to challenge the Department’s action, Pat must first exhaust her administrative remedies. She will begin by filing a request for hearing with the Human Services Board (HSB). The HSB is created pursuant to 3 V.S.A. §3090 and exists within the Agency of Human Services. The HSB consists of seven members appointed by the governor who in turn appoint hearing officers. 3 V.S.A. §3091 provides that an applicant for or a recipient of assistance, benefits or social services from the department of prevention, assistance, transition, and health access may file a request for a fair hearing if the individual is aggrieved by agency action affecting his or her receipt of assistance, benefits or services, or because the individual is aggrieved by agency policy as it affects his or her situation. The HSB must normally issue a written decision within 75 days of the request for fair hearing. 3 V.S.A. §3091(e). Pat may appeal the HSB decision to the Vermont Supreme Court. 3 V.S.A. §3091(f).
Before rescinding the rule the Department should have gone through the rulemaking process prescribed by the APA. The procedures are:
1) Prefiling with the Interagency on the Committee on Administrative Rules. 3 V.S.A. §837;
2) Filing of proposed rules with the Secretary of State. 3 V.S.A. §838;
3) Publication of proposed rules by the Secretary of State. 3 V.S.A. §839;
4) Conducting one or more public hearings. 3 V.S.A. §840;
5) Filing a final proposal with the Secretary of State and the Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules. 3 V.S.A. §841;
6) Thirty day review period by the Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules. 3 V.S.A. §842
7) Adoption by the Agency of Human Services and filing adopted rule with the Secretary of State and the Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules. 3 V.S.A. §843.
Board of Bar Examiners
Mailing address: 109 State St. Montpelier VT 05609-0702
Office Location: 111 State St. Montpelier, VT