MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION I - JULY 1996

     1. Roberta Woodward comes to you for advice. Discuss and analyze the
legality of me actions of me Council and the Authority Board.

     The Health Policy Council and the Health Care Authority are both "public
bodies" as that term is defined in Vermont's Open Meeting Law, 1 V.S.A. §§
310 - 314. This statute requires that all meetings of a public body are open
to the public, except as specifically exempted. § 312(a). The actions of both
the Council and the Authority should be analyzed in light of the Open Meeting
Law's requirements, as follows:

     (a) Quorum issues. The fact pattern states that a quorum of the Health
Policy Council is "a majority" of its 26 members. Because there are 15
members present at the May meeting of the Council, or one more than the 14
necessary to have a quorum, the Council's actions at the beginning of the
meeting are lawful.

     When the Council voted on whether to go into executive session, however,
only 12 members were present at the meeting; the fact pattern states that
three had left the room. Since that number is fewer than the 14 necessary to
have a quorum, the Council's vote to go into executive session was invalid,
since no public body can take formal action except in a public meeting, which
by definition requires a quorum. 1 V. S. A. § 31 2(a)

     (b) Public comments at Council meeting. 1 V. S.A. § 31 2(h) requires
that members of the public be given a "reasonable opportunity" to express
their opinions on matters considered by the public body during the meeting as
long as order is maintained, although the chair of the meeting has the
discretion to impose "reasonable rules" on the public comment time. Here, the
public comment was scheduled before anything actually occurred at the
meeting. By precluding the public from commenting after the substantive
discussion, the chair probably violated the Open Meeting Law. The fact that
members of the public had had previous opportunities to speak out on the
issue at hand probably does not change the analysis, since the Open Meeting
Law requires "reasonable opportunity" for comments at each meeting, not just
on each issue considered by a public body.

     (c) Executive session issues.

     (1) As noted earlier, because the executive session was called on a vote
by less than a quorum of the full Council, the action was invalid under 1
V.S.A. § 312(a)

       (2) Under 1 V.S.A. 313(a), an executive session may be held only after
the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the public body's members present. Even
the lack of a quorum not a problem, this requirement was not met since
only 7 of the 12 "members present" voted in favor of the motion. On these
grounds alone, the executive session was improper.

     (3) An executive session can be called only for one of the seven grounds
listed in 1 V.S.A. § 313(a):

     + Contracts, labor relations agreements with employees, arbitration,
mediation, grievances, civil actions, or prosecutions by the state, where
premature general public knowledge would clearly place the state,
municipality, other public body, or person involved at a substantial
disadvantage.

     + The negotiating or securing of real estate purchase options.

     + The appointment or employment or evaluation of a public officer or
employee. 

     + A disciplinary or dismissal action against a public officer or.

     + A clear and imminent peril to the public safety.

     + Discussion or consideration of records or documents excepted from the
access to public records provisions of 1 V.S.A. § 317(b).

     + The academic records or suspension or discipline of students.

     Because the "political sensitivity" of an issue is not a valid ground
for going into executive session, this portion of the meeting was invalid.

     (4) Even if the executive session had been properly called, the vote
taken during it has no validity, since under 1 V.S.A. § 313(a) no binding
actions may be taken in such a session except one to secure a real estate
contract under (a)(2). However, this is of little importance since the same
vote was taken once the Council reconvened the public portion of its meeting.
The Vermont Supreme Court has recently held that a public body may ratify,
through a later proper vote, an earlier, improperly-taken action. Valley
Realty & Development, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, No. 95-412 (Vt. Aug. 2, 1996),
slip op. at 7.

     (d) Appearance of a conflict of interest. According to the fact pattern,
two of the Council members were closely involved with the health care
industry - one was a hospital administrator, and one was on the board of
directors of another hospital. The applicable statutory conflict of interest
provisions, however, do not apply to the Council, which is a purely advisory
body. 3 V.S.A. § 204 applies only to public officials ("a person holding an
office under" the Administrative Departments chapter of Title 3), and 12
V.S.A. § 61(a) applies only to agencies and officials acting in quasijudicial
capacities. In re State Aid Highway No. 1, Peru, Vermont, 133 Vt. 4, 9
(1974). That is not the case here.

     (e) The Authority chair's meeting with Dr. Cardinal and members of the
Council. The meeting of the Health Care Authority chair, Dr. Cardinal, and
"several" Council members was not a public meeting, and therefore was not
subject to the Open Meeting Law. A meeting is "public" under 1 V.S.A. §
310(2) only if it is attended by a quorum of the members of a public body for
the purpose of discussing business or taking action. Since only one of the
Authority board's three members was there and only "several" of the Council's
26 members. there was no "Public meeting."

     (f) Rulemaking issues. The fact pattern states that the Authority began
the formal rulemaking proceedings as required by the Vermont Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), which requires the following:

(1) prefiling the proposed rule, when required;

(2) filing the proposed rule with the Secretary of State;

(3) publication of the proposed rule by the Secretary of State;

(4) holding a public hearing if one is requested by 25 persons, by a
governmental subdivision or agency, or by an association having 25 or more
members, and receiving comments;

(5) filing a final proposal with the Secretary of State and the
Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules;

(6) responding to the Committee's questions or concerns, when required; and

(7) filing the adopted rule with both the Secretary of State and the
Legislative Committee on Administrative Rules.

     In the absence of any facts in the question to the contrary, we can
assume that the Authority proceeded with this process.

     The Authority's attempt to turn its new policy into an emergency rule,
however, was invalid. Emergency rules are allowed under the APA only in
instances in which the agency believes there exists an"imminent peril to
pubic health, safety or welfare." 3 V.S.A. § 844(a). Even if the rule met
that standard, the emergency rule would be valid for only 120 days. § 844(b).
Thus, the Authority was correct in refusing to assert jurisdiction over the
proposed purchase of a hospital.

     (g) Even if the rule were properly adopted, either through the formal
rulemaking process or as an emergency rule, the Authority's attempt to expand
its jurisdiction beyond what is explicitly stated in its enabling statute
would be invalid for at least three reasons. First, under general principles
of administrative and constitutional law, the legislature cannot delegate its
functions to an administrative agency, which is part of the executive branch
of government. Second, administrative agencies have the powers implied by
their enabling statutes that are necessary to do what is required by those
statutes; they have no other implied powers. Trybulskt v. B.F. Hydroelectric
Corp., 112 Vt. 1 (1941). Third, the APA prohibits agencies from using their
rulemaking powers to require permits or licenses not otherwise specifically
authorized by law. 3 V.S.A. § 845(c).

     2. Discuss and analyze MCH's appeal and motion to me Supreme Court.

     (a) Appeal under FR.C.P. 75. MCH's appeal to the Supreme Court under
Rule 75 would be dismissed, since that rule provides review only to the
Superior Court of actions not appealable as "contested cases" under the APA
if the review is otherwise available by law

     (b) Appeal under 3 US.A. .§ 815(a). A person who has exhausted all
administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a
final decision in any "contested case" may file an appeal directly to the
Vermont Supreme Court if not other court is expressly provided by law. It is
unclear from the fact pattern whether MCH has exhausted all administrative
remedies before the Authority. Assuming that it has, however, a proceeding is
a "contested case" only where the agency is required by law or regulation to
hold a hearing. 3 V.S.A. § 801(b)(2). Here, where the Authority refused to
assert jurisdiction over the proposed purchase, there was no CON review and
there could not have been a requirement for a hearing. Therefore, there was
no "contested case" and there is no appeal under § 815(a) to the Supreme
Court. See Widschwenter v. Board of Bar Examiners, 151 Vt. 218, 219 (1989).

     (c) Motion for a stay. Even assuming that the Supreme Court was the
proper place in which to take an appeal, the Vermont Rules of Appellate
Procedure state that motions for a stay must be filed first with the
administrative agency acting in a quasijudicial capacity. Only after such a
motion has been denied by the agency may it be filed in the Supreme Court.
V.R.A.P. 8(a).

     So what could MCH do? First, section 808 of the APA provides that a
person can ask an administrative agency for a declaratory ruling "as to the
applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the
agency." A ruling on such a request has "the same status as agency decisions
or orders in contested cases." Id. Had MCH pursued this route, it probably
would have a right to appeal the Authority's final decision not to assert
jurisdiction under the emergency rule to the Supreme Court under § 815(a),
since it would have exhausted all its administrative remedies and be
appealing from a decision equivalent to that in a "contested case."

     Alternatively, 3 V.S.A. § 807 allows the filing of a declaratory
judgment action in Washington Superior Court if a rule, or its application,
"interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the
legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff." This action is available
whether or not the plaintiff has requested the agency to pass upon the
validity or applicability of the rule in question under § 808.

     Had an appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court been proper, that Court would
have reviewed the Authority's decision under a stringent standard of review,
since administrative agencies' actions within their particular areas of
expertise are presumed valid absent compelling indications of error. See
Vermont Development Credit Corp. v. Kitchel, 149 Vt. 421, 427 (1988) and In
re Agency of Administration, 141 Vt. 68, 74 - 75 (1982).

MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION II - JULY 1996


MEMORANDUM TO SENIOR PARTNER            August 1, 1996
FROM APPLICANT
RE: PLAIN v DEFEN

     A number of alternative ways to respond to these pleadings exists. I
would recommend we begin with a motion to dismiss. The motion should seek to
dismiss the action on the grounds of insufficiency of service of process,
insufficiency of process and improper venue. The motion would be in the
following form:

                                  (CAPTION)
                              MOTION TO DISMISS

     Now comes the defendant, by and through his attorneys, and pursuant to
V.R.C.P. 12(b) hereby moves the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaints
on the grounds of insufficiency of service of process, insufficiency of
process and improper venue.

     Under V.R.C.P. 4, a number of alternatives exist for the service of
process. Some of the alternatives are personal service by a person authorized
by law or some different person specially appointed for that purpose by a
Superior Court Judge. Personal service can be completed upon an individual by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally
or by leaving copies of the summons and complaint at the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and
discretion residing therein. Other alternatives to service also exist. One is
to serve the summons and complaint by first class mail, together with copies
of a notice and acknowledgment. If the acknowledgment is not returned within
20 days after the date of mailing, service may be accomplished by another
method prescribed by the rules.

     Under certain circumstances, service may be made by publication after a
showing that personal service cannot with due diligence be made. The Court on
motion may order service by leaving a copy of the summons and of the
complaint at the defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode.

     In the instant case the defendant was served by merely taping the
complaint and notice of deposition to his door. There is no indication that
this was done on motion and pursuant to a court order; therefore the service
is defective and the action should be dismissed.

     In addition, the plaintiff is required to serve a summons and complaint
upon the defendant. In the instant action only a complaint was attempted to
be served on the defendant.

     The instant action is also filed in an improper venue. The case brought
hy the plaintiffs against John Defen has no connection to Chittenden County.
Both parties reside in Washington County. 12 V.S.A. 402 requires that an
action shall be brought in the county in which one of the parties resides if
either resides in the state. As both the parties in the instant action reside
in the state, the action must be brought in the county in which one of the
parties resides. The only proper venue for the case brought by plaintiffs is
therefore Washington County.

     For these reasons defendant would request that the above action be
dismissed.

                                              ________________________
                                              Attorneys for John Defen
                                                    

       In addition to filing a motion to dismiss, the attorneys for John
  Defen should call the plaintiff's attorneys and seek to postpone or cancel
  the deposition by agreement. If that fails we should file a motion for a
  protective order seeking to quash the notice. The motion for protective
  order would take substantially the following form:

                                  (CAPTION)
                        MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

       Defendant hereby requests that the Court issue a protective order
  quashing plaintiff's notice of deposition of defendant. V.R.C.P. 30 states
  that the plaintiff is not entitled to take a deposition prior to the
  expiration of 30 days after the service of the summons and complaint upon
  any defendant unless certain conditions are met, none of which are
  applicable to the present matter. Plaintiff in the instant matter did not
  allow 30 days after the service of the complaint prior to the scheduling of
  a deposition and did not serve a summons. Defendant would therefore request
  that the Court issue a protective order quashing the notice of deposition.

                                              ________________________
                                              Attorneys for John Defen

       If for some reason we should decide not to raise the venue, process or
  sufficiency of process issues or if the action is properly filed and
  served, an answer needs to be filed in which Defen will need to admit, deny
  or state that he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
  belief as to the truth of an averment. Assuming that the complaint stays in
  its present form, an answer should be filed in substantially the following
  format:

                                  (CAPTION)
                                   ANSWER

       Now comes the defendant, by and through his attorneys, ... and
  responds to the plaintiff's complaint as follows:

       1. Admit.

       2. It is denied that defendant acted negligently; the balance of
  paragraph 2 is admitted.

       3. Defendant is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a
  belief as to the truth or falsity of the averment and therefore denies the
  same. 
                                  Count II

       4. Defendant is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a
  belief as to the truth or falsity of the averment and therefore denies the
  same. 
                                  Count III


       5. Defendant is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a
  belief as to the truth or falsity of the averment and therefore denies the
  same. 
                                  Count IV

       6. Defendant admits that David Plain was killed as a result of the
  collision. 
                                   Count V

       7. Defendant is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a
  belief as to the truth or falsity of the averment and therefore denies the
  same.

                            AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

       Defendant asserts the following affirmative defenses:

       1. Statute of limitations.

       2. Contributory negligence.

                                               ________________________
                                               Attorneys for John Defen

       Defendant should also consider asserting a counterclaim in the answer.
  If defendant desires to assert a counterclaim, it should be asserted in the
  answer since, under the facts given, it is a compulsory counterclaim. The
  counterclaim could be in the following form:

                                COUNTERCLAIM

       1. Mary Plain negligently operated her vehicle on public highway no. 2
  on January 1, 1994.

       2. As a result of Mary Plain's negligent operation of her vehicle, she
  caused a collision with a vehicle operated by John Defen.

       3. As a result of the collision, John Defen incurred medical bills in
  the amount of $ _, lost wages in the amount $_, and suffered great pain in
  body and mind.

       Wherefore, John Defen demands judgment against Mary Plain in an amount
  that is determined to be fair, just and equitable by the trier of fact.

                                              ________________________
                                              Attorneys for John Defen

       The plaintiff did not demand a jury trial. If Defen wants a jury
  trial, he should request one not only on the issues raised in plaintiff's
  complaint but also on Defen's counterclaim if one is asserted. We should
  also request our costs and expenses of the action. We, of course, will need
  to sign the answer and counterclaim.

       The basis for the affirmative defenses are as follows:

       1. Statute of limitations: Under V.R.C.P. 8, the statute of
  limitations should be asserted as an affirmative defense. A motion for
  summary judgment should be filed with regard to Count IV. The statute of
  limitations with regard to a wrongful death action is two years. See 14
  V.S.A. Sec. 1492.

       2. Contributory Negligence: The negligence of Mary Plain by abruptly
  pulling out may reduce or potentially eliminate her claim under Vermont's
  comparative negligence statute. See 12 V.S.A. 1036. Her recovery will be
  reduced by the percentage of negligence the jury attributes to her. If that
  percentage exceeds 50%, she will not recovery anything.

       Other issues that need to be raised are:

       1. Failure to join a party under Rule 19. The computer was the
  property of the corporation which is not a party. Frank is not a proper
  party plaintiff as to the computer. This may be raised in the answer, by
  motion, or at the trial on the merits.

       2. After depositions or other discovery have confirmed the facts
  given, defendant should move for summary judgment with regard to the
  negligent infliction of emotional distress claim of Frank Plain. He was not
  within the "zone of danger" and his claim is therefore fatally deficient.

MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION III - JULY 1996


       Bob and Wanda acquired title to both the mobile home and the real
  estate as tenants in common. Their subsequent marriage did not convert
  their tenancy in common to a tenancy by the entirety. When they purchased
  the mobile home it wa personal property, but by its very nature would
  become real property when it was affixed to some parcel of real estate. If
  Green Mountain filed the financing statement in the office where a mortgage
  on the real estate would be filed, then it made a "fixture" filing under 9A
  V.S.A. Sec. 9-313, and had a perfected security interest in the mobile home
  even after it became affixed to the land in which Sally had an earlier
  mortgage interest.

       The mobile home became a fixture when it was installed on the
  mortgaged premises. Personal property a fixture, and therefore becomes real
  property, when there is annexation to the realty, adaptation to the use of
  the realty, and an intent to make the property a part of the real estate.
  Sherburne Corn. v. Town of Sherburne, 124 Vt. 481 (1996). Personal property
  also becomes a fixture if it is so integrated with the real estate that it
  cannot be removed without causing serious damage to the real estate. The
  new septic tank and well are clearly fixture and cannot be removed without
  causing serious damage to the real estate. The mobile home can be separated
  from the real estate without damaging the real estate, but it too will be
  treated as a fixture because of the parties' intent. The concrete block
  foundation, steps, deck and mud room fall in a gray area, but are also
  treated as fixtures under general principles of property law. Therefore,
  when Bob and Wanda installed the mobile home on the land, it became subject
  to Sally's mortgage, but Green Mountain's security interest took priority
  over Sally's mortgage. Hartford National Bank and Trust Companv v. Godin.
  Godin and Greenfield Savings Bank, 137 Vt. 39 (1979).

       Green Mountain failed to file a continuation of its financing
  statement within five years of the date it acquired a security interest in
  the mobile home. Therefore, its security interest lapsed and Green Mountain
  lost its security in the mobile home. 9A V.S.A. Sec. 9-403(2)

       Fuel dealer's attachment reaches Bob's 1/2 interest in the mobile home
  and land, but not Wanda's.

       Therefore, Sally has a first mortgage interest in the mobile home and
  in the land. Fuel dealer has an attachment of Bob's 1/2 interest in the
  mobile home and land, subject to Sally's mortgage. Green Mountain's remedy
  is to bring an action on the debt owed by Bob and Wanda, and to attempt to
  get a real estate attachment of the mobile home and land. If it gets an
  attachment, the attachment will be junior in priority to Sally's mortgage,
  and to fuel dealer's attachment in Bob's undivided 1/2 interest in the
  property.

MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION IV - JULY 1996


I. Question I - Option 1 - 

       Nancy should file a request for an ex parse emergency relief from
  abuse order, alleging that Joe has physically abused her. She has to
  establish in her affidavit that he has abused her in the past, and that she
  is in imminent danger of further abuse. Nancy has enough facts to meet this
  burden: Joe recently caused her physical injury, he has a history of having
  abused her before, and the combination of his increased temper and
  excessive drinking have created a very volatile situation.

       Her initial emergency order will be good for 10 days. If she wants it
  to be extended beyond that time, she will need to appear for a further
  hearing, and Joe will be given an opportunity to contest the order at that
  hearing. If the Court grants her request for an extension, the final order
  can last indefinitely .

       As part of the initial emergency order, Nancy can request that the
  Court grant her: (a) sole temporary possession of the marital home, (b)
  sole temporary physical and legal parental rights and responsibilities for
  the children, and (c) temporary child support from Joe. If she is given
  sole temporary possession of the home, Joe will be forced to leave the
  premises and she can stay in the house with the children. This remedy is
  advantageous for her, since she cannot afford to move out.

       With respect to the Court's authority to order temporary child support
  order, the Court can issue such an order for up to 3 months only. If she
  needs support beyond that time Period she must commence a divorce or
  separation action .

   Option 2 - 

       Nancy can, and should, simultaneously file for a divorce or a legal
  separation, and ask the Court to issue an order for temporary relief. As
  part of its authority to grant temporary relief, the Court can determine
  who shall have sole temporary possession of the marital home, and sole
  temporary physical and legal parental rights and responsibilities for the
  children. The Court would have to schedule a hearing on this motion; it
  could not be done on an ex parse basis, as with the emergency relief from
  abuse order.

       In determining which party should have sole physical and legal
  parental rights and responsibilities, the Court would consider a number of
  factors. These factors would include the relationship of each party with
  the children, the children's needs, the children's ties to the community,
  and an analysis of which parent is the primary caretaker of the children.
  The party who is not awarded sole physical parental rights would be granted
  parent-child contact.

       A decision as to which party should be awarded sole temporary
  possession of the marital home would most likely be dependent upon the
  parental rights determination. The Family Court would be reluctant to
  displace the children from their home, and it would grant sole possession
  of the home to the parent who was given sole physical parental
  responsibility for the children.

       Nancy is also entitled to half of the equity value in Joe's business.
  She contributed her bookkeeping services during the business' infancy
  years, and the business is considered a marital asset to be shared by both
  of them. Moreover, her agreement to stay at home with the children after
  the birth of the second child allowed Joe to spend all of his time
  developing the business, since he was not the primary caretaker of the
  children. The business has a net equity value of $25,000.00, because of the
  liens against it, and Nancy should ask for half of that value.

       With respect to all of the marital assets, including the real estate
  and the business, Nancy can also ask the Court to award her more than half
  of the assets because of Joe's fault in the breakup of the marriage. In
  this instance, Nancy was abused throughout the marriage by Joe, and it is
  this abuse that directly led to the dissolution of the marriage. The court
  may take fault into consideration in any division of property, and Nancy
  should raise this issue.

       The question of whether the $250 per month that Joe has offered is to
  be treated as spousal support to Nancy, or as some form of child support,
  has tax consequences for her. Spousal support is taxable income to Nancy,
  and it is tax deductible for Joe. Child support is neither taxable income,
  nor is it deductible. Nancy could try to get Joe to agree that the money be
  treated as a maintenance supplement, which is considered an additional
  child support amount, and this would not be taxable income to her.

       However, Nancy is better off accepting the money as alimony because,
  as analyzed above, she is entitled to spousal support. She will not be able
  to maintain herself at the marital standard of living with her limited work
  experience as a hairdresser, or in bookkeeping. She will need
  rehabilitative maintenance for a period of years in order to gain financial
  independence for herself and the family. In addition, if she waives her
  right to spousal support in the final divorce order, that waiver will be
  final and she will not be able to ask the Court to modify this later if her
  financial situation worsens after the divorce .

       Whether the $250.00 that Joe has offered is an acceptable amount of
  spousal support will depend on an analysis of her financial needs and Joe's
  future income and personal expenses.

       Assuming that Nancy is given sole physical parental rights, then the
  Court would also hold a separate child support hearing to determine how
  much Joe should pay to her for child support. Unlike the limited relief
  from abuse order, the child support would be permanent or until modified by
  the Court. Child support is determined based upon the parties' joint gross
  incomes, and, at this point, Joe is the only wage earner. If Nancy finds
  employment, her wages and childcare expenses would be taken into account,
  as well.

       As part of the divorce or separation, Nancy could also make a request
  that Joe pay her spousal support or maintenance. A spouse is entitled to
  maintenance when there has been a long-term marriage, and that spouse
  cannot sustain herself in the same standard of living that the parties had
  during the marriage. The Court would look at Nancy's financial needs, her
  current and potential sources of income, Joe's income and his needs,
  Nancy's future employment opportunities, Nancy's need to spend time with
  the children, and the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Nancy
  is a likely candidate for spousal maintenance, given the sacrifices that
  she made to stay at home with the children, the fact that she has been out
  of the workplace for a number of years, and Joe's actual and potential
  income earning capacity.

II. Question II -

       Nancy should reject Joe's offer.

       In arriving at a division of property, the Court has to consider many
  factors, including the length of the marriage, the health and education of
  the parties, their current employment and future income earning potential,
  each party's contribution to the acquisition and preservation of assets
  (including the services of a homemaker), and fault, if any.

       With respect to the house and land, Nancy should insist on receiving
  at least half of the net equity. There is $80,000.00 of equity in the real
  estate, after the mortgage is deducted from the fair market value. Although
  the land was given to the parties by Joe's family, it was a gift to both of
  them since it occurred after the marriage. The parties have been married 10
  years, and they purchased the modular home together; it has been the family
  home for them and their children ever since that time. In addition, Nancy
  has contributed her services as homemaker, and she has directly helped out
  with improvements made to the original structure.

       Nancy should not agree to have the house sold within a year. Since she
  has sole physical parental rights for the children, the Court will most
  likely allow her to stay in the home until the children reach 18 years of
  age or finish high school. Nancy can offer to give Joe a promissory note
  and mortgage for his 1/2 interest in the equity, payable when the children
  reach majority. Joe is not entitled to keep 100% of the value that the
  land had at the time he and Nancy received it, since it was a gift to both
  parties. All property acquired during the marriage is marital property.

MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION V - JULY 1996


       1. The general rule is that all property the testator has an ownership
  interest in at the time of her death will be included in her estate. This
  means that the car, house and home furnishings that were Janet's are part
  of the estate. All of Janet's debt (credit card, car loan, mortgage) is
  part of the estate as are her mutual funds and the savings account in her
  own name.

       The joint bank account is probably not a part of the estate if the
  entire balance can be withdrawn by either person who is named on the
  account. Janet's 1/2 interest in the truck is part of the estate, but
  John's interest is not. None of John's furnishings are part of the estate.
  Unless an insurance policy is poured into an estate it is not considered
  part of the probate estate. Thus in this instance the insurance policy is
  distributed outside of the estate as part of a contract between the
  insurance company and Janet. Note however, that if Janet retained the right
  to change the beneficiary, the insurance proceeds would be considered part
  of the estate for estate tax purposes.

       Note that John has no legal interest in the house since his name is
  not on the deed and he was not married to Janet so there is no homestead
  interest.

       2a. In order for a will to be valid in Vermont it must be executed by
  a testator with proper testamentary capacity. Testamentary capacity
  includes an ability to understand the natural objects of her bounty, the
  nature and extent of her property and the significance of her act. The will
  must be signed in front of three competent witnesses who also witness each
  other's signatures. A will may be revoked by a subsequent properly executed
  will stating that all prior wills are revoked, or by marking or destroying
  the will.

       The second will is probably valid. Although Vermont does not recognize
  holographic wills, a will may be handwritten so long as it is properly
  executed and witnessed by three competent people. In this case the second
  will was properly executed and expressly revoked the prior will. Note that
  the second will is valid even though one of the witnesses is named as a
  beneficiary in the will, and another is a legal heir who is named in the
  will. Under 14 V.S.A. 10 if a person other than an heir at law witnesses a
  will in which he or she (or spouse) is a beneficiary, then the bequest or
  devise is void so far as concerns that individual, or person claiming under
  that individual. This means that although the second will is valid, the
  gift to John will lapse and his interest will pass through intestate
  succession. A gift to Steve would be valid since, as Janet's son, he was an
  "heir at law".

       2b. If the first will is found to be valid the will could be defeated
  by Katherine, an afterborn child who was not named in the will. She would
  take in accordance with the laws of intestate succession (one-fourth of the
  entire estate), 14 V.S.A. 555, paid from the "rest and residue of the
  estate." 14 V.S.A. 557. The personal property will be divided between Sara
  and Dave (since it says "share and share alike" which the court interprets
  as not passing to issue). The $5000 bequest will be given to the charity
  and what is left of the remainder interest (after Katherine's share) shall
  be divided equally between Sara, Dave and Sam (Sam will receive, since "per
  stirpes" means that the gift will pass to issue). Dave and Sam's share will
  be placed into a trust until they are 21 years old. Before anyone is paid
  from the estate, all funeral and burial expenses will be paid, then the
  costs of administration of the estate and all outstanding debts will be
  taken care of.

       John will not receive anything under this will, and cannot defeat the
  will, because he was not married to Janet. (No common law marriage in
  Vermont.)

       2c. If the second will is found to be valid, the house and its
  furnishing will be divided between Sara, Dave and Katherine. Note that Sam
  is not entitled to a share since the will provides this distribution to "my
  children, now living," and the language of a will "speaks" at the time of
  death. Thus, while Steve was alive at the time the will was signed, he
  predeceased Janet, so the gift to him lapses under this provision.

       Note that Katherine's entitlement to inherit is not effected by the
  fact that she was born out of wedlock. 14 V.S.A. 553 .

       With the exception of $2000 to be given to charity, the remainder of
  the estate will be distributed Outside of the will since John cannot take
  from a will that he has witnessed. This means that Sara, Dave, Katherine
  and Steve's legal representative (and ultimately Sam) would each take an
  equal share of the remainder interest.

       As discussed above, the estate would first pay all of the all funeral
  and burial expenses, then the costs of administration of the estate and all
  outstanding debts will be taken care of. Then the specific bequest to the
  charity will be paid.

       2d. The doctrine of Cy Pres provides that when a charity is no longer
  in existence at the time a will is probated, if the will indicates a
  general charitable intent, then a similar organization can be granted the
  bequest. 14 V.S.A. 2328. Otherwise, the gift would lapse and would pass
  through intestate succession.

       In this case, the first will indicates no generalized charitable
  intent since it simply names the specific charity. The second will
  indicates a general charitable intent "to protect children from abuse in
  our society." Accordingly, under the second will, an alternate charity can
  be designated to receive the bequest.

       3a. An executor should be appointed (Sara, under the second will) who
  can manage the estate and pay the bills as they become due. The executor
  can petition the probate court for permission to sell mutual funds or the
  car in order to pay the current expenses of the estate. In addition, she is
  able to use the savings account to pay these expenses. The executor must
  protect the assets during the probate period.

       3b. The probate court could be petitioned to allow money to be
  released to pay for Dave's College tuition, room and board. Any amounts
  distributed to him will reduce his share of the distribution. 14 V.S.A.
  2322. Note that provisions for the care of minor children can be made while
  the estate is being probated, however, since Dave is over 18 this will not
  apply to him.

       3c. The executor has an obligation to preserve the assets of the
  estate. This may mean preventing John from continuing in his renovations if
  they will diminish the value of the house. In addition, the executor might
  require John to pay a reasonable rent for the house while the estate is
  pending. The executor might also try to prevent John from using the car,
  and requiring the truck to be repaired. As a practical matter, the
  beneficiaries might be inclined to allow John to remain in the home (since
  it is Katherine's home) but might request that he refrain from making major
  changes to the home until they could all decide what was going to happen
  with it. (Perhaps John will buy out their interest in the house with the
  insurance proceeds).

MODEL ANSWER - QUESTION VI - JULY 1996


       1. I would recommend a limited liability company, under Vermont's new
  statutes.

       2. a) There are no limits on the number or kind of "persons" who may
  be owners of a limited liability company (LLC). There are also no limits on
  the number or kind of persons who may be owners of more traditional
  business forms, such as partnerships, limited partnerships, and
  corporations. However, in order for a corporation to receive favorable
  pass-through income tax treatment under Subchapter S of the Internal
  Revenue Code, that corporation may not have more than 35 shareholders, and
  none of them may be corporations, or non-residents of the United States. A
  Subchapter S Corporation is thus not a good option here.

       b) Only an LLC would give this group the kind of flexibility they seek
  regarding business involvement. In a corporation, the shareholders have
  limited involvement in the day-to-day operation of the business, unless
  they become officers or directors. In a partnership, all of the partners,
  in theory, share decision making authority and responsibility for the day
  to day functioning of the business, but they also share liability for its
  debts. In a limited partnership, only the general partner or partners
  control the business. A limited partner who becomes actively involved in
  the operation of the business will lose his or her limited liability. In an
  LLC, there are two management style choices. The business may be member
  managed, approximating a partnership (but without partnership liability),
  or manager-managed, having a centralized management, and approximating a
  corporate style. The decision whether to have centralized (manager-managed)
  management must be made when the LLC is established, and incorporated into
  the LLC articles. In this case, as I will discuss below, because of the
  members' desire to be able to avoid the duty of loyalty to the company,
  they should choose to be manager-managed. Members will still be able to
  take active part in the running of the business. Unlike in a limited
  partnership, members of an LLC do not lose their limited liability if they
  become involved in the operation of the business.

       c) They are right to be concerned about liability protection in light
  of the particular business they have chosen. An LLC gives all members
  protection from liability for the obligations of the business. Members risk
  only the investment they have made in the corporation. A limited
  partnership would give them the same advantage, but they could have no
  involvement in the active running of the business. A corporation would also
  offer limited liability to shareholders. However, in a traditional
  partnership all of the partners are liable for partnership obligations, and
  may be sued individually by creditors of the partnership.

       d) If the LLC is established correctly, it will fit within the IRS
  safe harbor rules allowing such organizations to pass through profits to
  the members, so there will be tax consequences at only one level (to the
  members). In order to obtain this favorable tax treatment the investors
  need to make it clear in the articles of organization of the company that
  the LLC has no more than two of the traditional corporate characteristics:
  1. continuity of life, 2. free transferability of interests, 3. limited
  liability, and 4. centralized management. In this case, the investors
  require limited liability and centralized management (to retain the right
  to avoid the duty of loyalty), so they must not have continuity of life or
  free transferability of interests. An LLC under Vermont law lacks
  continuity of life by definition, because on the death, retirement, or
  resignation of a member, it requires a majority vote of the remaining
  members to continue the business. This is sufficient to meet IRS
  requirements. These investors will be able to avoid being labeled as having
  free transferability of interests as long as the members cannot sell or
  transfer their interests without the consent of the other members.

       The disadvantage of the LLC's tax treatment by the IRS, is that it is
  necessary to obtain private letter rulings in advance to be sure that the
  particular LLC will meet the IRS guidelines. An S corporation is
  automatically entitled to pass through partnership-type taxation, as long
  as it meets the IRS's requirements regarding number and type of
  shareholders, and class of stock (only one is allowed). A partnership or
  limited partnership is also automatically entitled to pass through
  taxation, of course. (A corporation which does not meet Subchapter S
  requirements is taxed at the corporate level, and then any profits it
  distributes to shareholders are taxed again to the shareholders.)

       3. Again, the LLC is clearly the form which best meets these
  investors' unique requirements. In an LLC, the owners may be involved in
  some of the business decisions, and avoid a duty of loyalty as well (as
  long as the LLCis manager-managed). In addition, the LLC agreement may
  specify particular kinds of activities in which members may engage which
  will not be treated as a breach of the duty of loyalty to the business,
  even if it is member managed. These exemptions could not extend as far as
  Philips has suggested, however. Direct competition in a similar business
  would be a breach of loyalty by a member-manager even in an LLC. Therefore,
  manager-management seems to be the best choice for this particular LLC.

       4. In a manager-managed LLC, the death of one of the members has no
  effect upon the continuation of the business, unless that member is also a
  manager, in which case the business may continue if a majority of the
  members vote to do so. Upon the death of a member, the decedent's successor
  in interest may enforce that member's purchase right (right to obtain fair
  value and terms of purchase of that member's distributional interest), but
  the successor in interest does not automatically become a member of the
  T.T.

       5. I have been contacted by Reynolds and Philips only. I can continue
  to represent and advise them of the best means to meet their goals, even if
  the other members of their potential investment group do not share all of
  those goals. I would urge any of the potential investors who have different
  goals to obtain their own attorneys, so that we can all work together to
  find a business plan that will best meet the goals of all the potential
  investors, after negotiating and exchanging proposals. Clearly, I cannot
  represent investors with divergent interests; that would be a conflict of
  interest.



  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Board of Bar Examiners


  Mailing address:  109 State St.
                    Montpelier VT  05609-0702


  Office Locaation:  111 State St.
                     Montpelier, VT

  Telephone:  (802)828-3281