Sec., ANR v. Henry, DECISION AND ORDER, (E93-030) STATE OF VERMONT JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT ENVIRONMENTAL LAW DIVISION Secretary, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, v. Docket No. E93-030 Leo R. Henry and Nancy Henry, Respondents. DECISION AND ORDER On April 30, 1993, the Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (the Agency) issued an administrative order pursuant to 10 V.S.A.  8008 regarding Respondents, which was served on Respondents on May 17, 1993. Respondents requested a hearing and, pursuant to 10 V.S.A.  8012(d), the Greenwoods Tenants' Association (the Tenants) was granted party status. On August 11, 1993, based on the stipulation of the parties, the Court entered an Emergency Order in this matter as well. On August 8, 1994, the Court granted the Secretary's motion to amend the administrative order. In the Amended Administrative Order, the Secretary alleged a further violation, requested that a receiver be appointed to manage the water system and the remaining rented lots and septic systems, and dropped the request to vacate the remaining mobile homes. The Court conducted a site visit and held hearings on the merits; requests for findings and memoranda of law were filed on December 23, 1994. Requests for findings not incorporated herein are denied. Respondents are represented by Richard A. Gadbois, Esq.; the Secretary is represented by Christine Melicharek, Esq.; and the Greenwoods Tenants' Association is represented by Lila Shapero, Esq. and John McCullough, III, Esq. of Vermont Legal Aid. The Court extended the time for the hearing for good cause at the request of and by agreement of the parties, to accommodate the schedules of the parties and to allow the parties to discuss agreement to undisputed facts. The Court also extended the time for the issuance of the decision for good cause, due to the complexity of the facts and due to technical difficulties which made the Secretary's voluminous requests for findings unavailable on disk. The statutes and rules applicable to this matter are 4 V.S.A. Chapter 27; 10 V.S.A. Chapter 201; 10 V.S.A. Chapter 151 (Act 250), the Environmental Board Rules, in particular Rule 2(A)(3) and (A)(6); 10 V.S.A. Chapter 153 (Mobile Home Parks), the Environmental Protection Rules, Chapter 6, (Mobile Home Parks); 10 V.S.A. Chapter 56 (Public Water Supply); the Environmental Protection Rules, Chapter 21 (Water Supply) and the former Vermont Health Regulations, Ch. 5, Subchapter 12, (Public Water Systems). No permits have been issued which are applicable to this matter. 10 V.S.A. 8012(c)(2). Findings (10 V.S.A. 8012(c)(1)): The Town of Alburg has not adopted zoning or subdivision bylaws. Respondents own and control a tract of land (referred to in this decision as "Respondents' property") totalling approximately 413 acres, adjacent to the Canadian border in Alburg, Vermont. They obtained that land in three transactions: approximately 207 acres from Mr. Henry's parents in 1967 (Volume 39, Page 122 of the Town of Alburg Land Records to Leo Henry alone and Volume 39, Page 571 to both Respondents), an additional 134 acres in 1978 (Volume 44, Page 282), and three additional parcels in 1981 (Volume 48, Page 136). Respondents operated a dairy farm on the property. Respondents' property is bounded on the north by the Canadian border and on the south by Greenwoods Road, except that it includes a small triangular lot south of Greenwoods Road. Respondents' property is roughly bisected by Henry Road, which runs south from the Canadian border and makes a T-intersection with Greenwoods Road. A survey of Respondents' property was performed by Vermont-licensed land surveyor Todd Taylor in October, 1992, and a final revised edition of that survey was produced on January 5, 1993. A small parcel bounded on the north by the Canadian border and on the west by Henry Road was conveyed in 1973 by a former owner (one Mirko Tomic) to one Peter Fleurant (Volume 41, Page 225), as referred to in the corrective Benjamin deed and the Taylor survey. This parcel is not considered part of Respondents' property for the purposes of this decision, although it appears to be used by Respondents as a roadway or right-of-way to several of the mobile homes which are the subject of this matter. Respondents have conveyed four small lots out of their property since June 1, 1970. Of these lots, the dwellings on the Hakey and Maskell lots are served by the water system owned or controlled by Respondents, but the dwellings on the Murray and Benjamin lots have their own sources of water. On May 29, 1981 (Volume 47, Page 300; corrective deed at Volume 65, Page 448), Respondents conveyed to Larry and Wendy Benjamin an approximately one acre lot on the easterly side of Henry Road south of the Fleurant lot. On April 26, 1985 (Volume 52, Page 317), Respondents conveyed to Roy R. Maskell, Sr. and Rose M. Maskell an approximately 207 by 207 foot lot bounded on the west by Henry Road and located across Henry Road from the old barn and Well #2. On April 1, 1986 (Volume 54, Page 403), Respondents conveyed to Donald and Cynthia Hakey an approximately 65 by 80 foot lot bounded on the east by Henry Road. In this conveyance Respondents retained rights to use the well (Well #1) located on the Hakey lot. On May 13, 1988 (Volume 58, Page 168), Respondents conveyed to Gary L. Murray an approximately « acre lot (just north of the "cluster" of six mobile homes) bounded on the north by the Canadian border and on the east by Henry Road. As of October 24, 1994, a portion of Respondents' property on Greenwoods Road identified on the Taylor survey by the letter "A" contained one mobile home. Although Respondent Leo Henry may have thought that he had conveyed this lot to his brother-in-law Mike LaFarr, there was no evidence of any deed accomplishing such a transaction, nor any recording of any such document, and Respondents are treated by the Town for tax purposes as owning that parcel. For the purposes of this decision, we find that parcel to be part of the property owned or controlled by Respondents. Theresa McCormick lives in the so-called "gold" house on the lot on Greenwoods Road identified in the Taylor survey as owned by the Town of Alburg and denoted by the number 7 and the designation "Old School House Lot." There was no evidence that Theresa McCormick pays rent to Respondents nor any documentary evidence that she owns this lot. Respondents are treated by the Town for tax purposes as owning that parcel. For the purposes of this decision, we find that parcel to be part of the property owned or controlled by Respondents, although such a finding is not necessary to any of the conclusions of violation made in this decision. We also find that the house on that lot is a service connection of the water system owned or controlled by Respondents which is at issue in this matter. While Respondents' property may have contained mobile homes from time to time prior to 1970, it was not registered as a pre-existing mobile home park with the Agency, and we cannot find from the evidence that as of June 1, 1970 it contained two or more (FN1) mobile homes. In 1974 Respondents' property contained one mobile home on the east side of Henry Road, on the lot which later was conveyed to the Benjamins in 1981. A driveway led to that mobile home, but there was no other roadway on the east side of Henry Road, and no roadway surrounding the Benjamin lot. In 1974 and in 1977 Respondents' property contained no other mobile homes on the east side of Henry Road and contained no mobile homes on the west side of Henry Road. From 1978 (FN2) through the spring of 1981, Respondents' property contained at least one mobile home, on the west rather than the east side of Henry Road. From 1974 through 1986, Respondents' property contained no mobile homes on Respondents' property on Greenwoods Road. Accordingly, we find that at some time in 1988, Respondents' property first contained a second mobile home. At some time soon after September 15, 1988, Environmental Inspector James Dodge visited the site. Mr. Dodge died on August 12, 1990. Without evidence as to the month or date on which the second mobile home was added in 1988, we find that date to be January 1, 1989 for the purposes of this decision. Two mobile homes were added to Respondents' property on Greenwoods Road in 1989, one on the north side of Greenwoods Road and one on the south side of Greenwoods Road in the small triangular piece of Respondents' property located on the other side of that road. Additional mobile homes were added, removed and moved between January 1, 1989 and July 24, 1991. As of October 19, 1989, Respondents' property contained at least eight mobile homes. As of July 24, 1991, Respondents' property contained thirteen mobile homes: a cluster of six mobile homes on the west side of Henry Road, five mobile homes on the east side of Henry Road, and two mobile homes on Greenwoods Road. The evidence did not show on what date prior to July 24, 1991, the number of residential units constructed, installed or maintained after June 1, 1970 on Respondents' property first exceeded ten, nor whether Respondents' home and the gold house should be considered in that determination. Therefore, for the purposes of this decision and only considering the installation of mobile homes on Respondents' property, we find that date to be July 24, 1991. Between September of 1988 and July 24, 1991, the Secretary took no official administrative action against Respondents and no Agency representative discussed the potential violations with Respondents. On July 24, 1991, an Environmental Enforcement Officer from the Agency of Natural Resources inspected Respondents' property and issued a Notice of Alleged Violation (NOAV), which Respondent Leo Henry signed as having received on that date. The NOAV advised Respondents that they were in violation by operating a mobile home park without a permit, by having installed the water supply and wastewater systems for the mobile home park without engineering certification, and by having installed six mobile homes on the property without a permit. The NOAV directed Respondents to have an engineer evaluate the system by August 15, 1991 and to obtain a mobile home park permit by September 1, 1991. As of August 14, 1991, Respondents' property contained twelve mobile homes: a cluster of six mobile homes on the west side of Henry Road, four mobile homes on the east side of Henry Road, and two mobile homes on Greenwoods Road. On that date, Respondents filed an application with the Agency seeking an exemption from the mobile home park regulations based on a sketch plan showing 10-acre lots elsewhere on Respondents' property, but allocated to each mobile home. On October 16, 1991, the Assistant Regional Engineer responded in writing, advising Respondents that, based on the sketch plan, Respondents' property would not be exempt because each mobile home was not on its own 10-acre lot. Respondents received that letter, and did not seek a declaratory ruling or otherwise challenge the jurisdictional determination made in that letter. The letter allowed Respondents to submit engineering plans and an application for a mobile home park. The letter also advised Respondents that the water supply and waste water disposal systems for the mobile homes would have to be designed by a professional engineer, and that the property potentially also was subject to Act 250 and the public water system law. Between August of 1991 and October of 1994, the configuration of mobile homes on Respondents' property changed from time to time. On April 23, 1992, the Environmental Enforcement Officer again inspected Respondents' property and issued another NOAV, which Respondent Leo Henry signed as receiving on April 23, 1992. The NOAV was followed by a letter dated April 27, 1992 and received by Respondent Nancy Henry on May 1, 1992. At the time of that inspection, none of the actions required by the 1991 NOAV had been accomplished. The 1992 NOAV essentially extended the deadlines in the 1991 NOAV to June 1, 1992 for the engineering evaluation, submittal of the evaluation by July 1, 1992, and obtaining and compliance with a mobile home park permit by August 1, 1992. Respondents did not seek a declaratory ruling or otherwise challenge the jurisdictional determination made in either NOAV. By June 8, 1992, Respondents had retained an engineering firm to conduct the evaluation. On July 23, 1992, Respondents, their engineers, the Environmental Enforcement Officer and the Assistant Regional Engineer met at the site to conduct the soils testing necessary to determine the suitability of sites for sewage disposal. Of the approximately 16 test pits, only four showed soils suitable for a mound system, and none met the standards for a conventional system. The suitable soils were located on the property near Respondents' house, not near the mobile homes on Henry Road. In November of 1993, three additional test pits were dug, none of which showed soils suitable for either a mound or a conventional system. During the period between October of 1991 and July of 1992, the Assistant Regional Engineer considered Respondents to be making a good faith effort towards coming into compliance, even though some deadlines were not met. Respondents have been forthcoming with the Secretary regarding the alleged violations. On September 8, 1992, Respondents wrote the District Coordinator of the District 6 Environmental Commission, with jurisdiction over Act 250, that Respondents intended to convey or hold no more than 9 dwelling units, and intended no new road construction over 800 feet. In October, 1992, Respondents' property contained 14 mobile homes. On January 27, 1993 the District Coordinator issued Respondents a project review sheet concluding that the project was subject to Act 250 due to the installation of ten or more mobile home units. Respondents did not seek a declaratory ruling or otherwise challenge that ruling. Respondents have not applied for or obtained an Act 250 permit for Respondents' property. The initial Administrative Order in this matter was issued by the Secretary on April 30, 1993. Between that date and October, 1994, Respondents allowed several mobile homes to be moved or removed, and one to be added near the old barn and Well #2. As of October 24, 1994, ten mobile homes were located on Respondents' property as follows: five in the cluster on the west side of Henry Road (L. & A. Commo, A. Commo, Buttles/Therrien, Anderson, and Wheeler), one near the barn on the west side of Henry Road (Thornton), two on the east side of Henry Road (one (N. Marchant) northeast of the Benjamins and one (Barratt/Comstock) south of the Benjamins), and two on Greenwoods Road (LaFarr (occupied by R. & C. Marchant) and Callahan). Of those mobile homes, two (N. Marchant and Thornton) are occupied by persons who work part-time for the Respondents, and are paid by Respondents for that part-time work, and pay rent to Respondents for a mobile home lot. By July 24, 1991, Respondents had constructed a roadway with three segments measuring 105 feet, 135 feet, and 65 feet in length, totalling 305 feet in length, to access the cluster of six mobile homes. Beginning in November of 1992 and finishing in the spring of 1993, Respondents constructed a roadway of 195 feet in length along the south side of the Benjamin property and 350 feet along the east side of the Benjamin property to provide access to the three or four mobile homes to the north and east of the Benjamin property. Respondents also improved a right-of-way of 200 feet along what appears to be the Fleurant property to access those mobile homes. Within a period of ten years prior to September of 1993, Respondents constructed improvements for roads totalling at 850 feet, incidental to the lease of mobile home lots, not including the right-of-way to the north of the Benjamin property. By July 24, 1991, Respondents had constructed improvements on roads providing access to more than five lots. In the 1980s Respondents constructed septic systems to serve the mobile homes in the cluster. Respondents constructed septic systems to serve the mobile homes on the east side of Henry Road, except for the Barratt/Comstock household. Respondents did not have the systems designed or constructed by an engineer or environmental consultant. Respondent Leo Henry is experienced in the installation of septic systems, but is not an engineer and did not have the soils tested before installing the systems. Of the six mobile homes, two had their own septic tanks and leach fields, two shared a septic tank and leach field, and two others shared a septic tank and leach field. The septic systems all have 1000-gallon septic tanks. The shared tanks are undersized for two households. The leach field for each system is 3« feet wide and 100 to 150 feet long, consisting of perforated pipe set in a bed of crushed stone. The trenches are inadequate in that they do not have six to 12 inches of stone below the pipe and two inches above the pipe. All the leach fields extend generally westerly of the cluster. The soils in the area of these leach fields are not suitable for proper treatment of the sewage and the leach fields are located in the groundwater table. The leach fields are susceptible to "plugging up." One leach line broke due to heavy equipment driving over the area, and Respondents repaired the broken line promptly. To the east of Henry Road, the Barratt/Comstock mobile home and at least one of the mobile homes to the north of the Benjamin property were served by in-ground sewage disposal systems which between 1988 and 1993 experienced problems with surfacing sewage. Respondents installed a new leach field for one of the mobile homes to the north of the Benjamin property. Several other mobile homes to the northeast of the Benjamin property in 1991 and 1992 lacked sewage disposal systems or experienced freezing of the sewage disposal system, resulting in the occupants' experiencing actual public health harm by having to use buckets for their sanitary waste and to dispose of the contents of the buckets on the field to the east of the mobile homes. In or about July of 1993, sewage surfaced to the west of the north end of the cluster of mobile homes. Respondents covered the area of surfacing sewage with dirt. On May 23, 1994, areas of surfacing sewage existed to the west of Henry Road near the mobile homes to the northeast of the Benjamin property, and near the Barratt/Comstock mobile home. On June 30, 1994, surfacing sewage ponded in an area approximately 70 feet west of the cluster of mobile homes and a second area of surfacing sewage caused an area of ground to be spongy and wet approximately 75 feet further to the west. On the advice of a Department of Health Senior Environmental Engineer, Respondents placed limestone on the ground in the area of surfacing sewage. Under the circumstances, the placement of limestone was an adequate temporary solution to the problem of surfacing sewage, but is not a permanent solution. Methods to reduce the flow of wastewater into a septic system, such as low-flow plumbing fixtures, and periodic pumping of the tanks on such systems, can reduce the likelihood that the effluent will surface. Serious potential harm to human health and the environment has resulted from the construction and location of the septic systems and the surfacing of effluent from those systems from time to time. Effluent enters the groundwater from these systems without treatment or without adequate treatment, especially during periods of seasonal high groundwater. Bacteria and viruses contained in the sewage can live in groundwater for extended periods of time, up to two years, and can travel within the groundwater, risking contamination of the groundwater and hence the sources of drinking water for the households on or near Respondents' property. If not fenced off, areas of surfacing effluent pose a risk to human health of persons, particularly children, who may come in physical contact with it. Respondents constructed and improved the water supply system serving their residence and barn, all the mobile homes on Respondents' property on both Greenwoods and Henry Roads, the gold house, and the Hakey and Maskell residences. As of October 19, 1989, the water supply system served at least ten service connections: at least eight mobile homes, the gold house, and the Henry, Hakey and Maskell residences. As of July 1, 1991, responsibility for the state's public water supply program was transferred from the Department of Health to the Agency of Natural Resources. 10 V.S.A. Ch. 56. Four functioning water supply wells supply water to the system. None of the wells has been approved under the state Public Water Supply regulations. Well #1 is located close to the southwest corner of the Hakey house on the Hakey property. Respondents retained an easement to use Well #1 when they conveyed that property to the Hakeys. A farm field is located immediately to the south and west of Well #1. The septic tank serving the Hakey house is located to the northwest of the house and the leach field for that septic system is located in the field to the west of the house. Well #2 is located approximately 20 feet from Henry Road in a concrete area adjacent to the old barn across from the Maskell house. Well #3 is located directly to the west of the Henry house. Well #4 is located directly to the east of the gold house on Greenwoods Road. Prior to September of 1993, Respondents had allowed farm animals into the concrete yard surrounding Well #2. The concrete of the yard is cracked. In September 1993, Well #2 was covered by a concrete lid over a layer of fiberglass batting. The well had an open-ended casing of a diameter of approximately 2« inches. A concrete cylinder surrounded the well. Several feet of dirty water containing manure and straw occupied the space between the concrete cylinder and the well casing. An open-ended casing creates the potential for contaminated water and foreign matter entering the well if the ground water level should rise. Well #2 had not been examined by a professional engineer. By October of 1993, Respondents had improved the condition of Well #2 by pumping out the water between the well casing and the concrete cylinder, and replacing it with clean sand, and by placing about a quart of chlorine in the well. On July 21, 1994, Well #2 was covered by an insulated concrete cover. The concrete cylinder surrounding the well casing extended approximately three feet above the ground level. An occupied mobile home was placed within 25 feet of Well #2, with a wastewater pipe extending from it to the west near the surface of the ground, covered by a thin layer of soil. An old oil filter and some spilled oil were on the ground within 25 feet of Well #2. The materials in the vicinity of Well #2, including the wastewater from the mobile home, could reach the groundwater supplying water to Well #2. Wells #1 and #2 are permanently connected by a water line. The Maskell house is served by Well #2. A water line runs from Wells #1 and #2 northerly along the west side of Henry Road, serving the Hakey house and the mobile homes in the cluster. Another water line is connected to it which runs across Henry Road to the south and east of the Benjamin house, serving the Barratt/Comstock mobile home and the mobile home to the north of the Benjamins occupied by Nicole Marchant. From time to time before that line was installed in 1992, the four mobile homes then located to the northeast of the Benjamin property were served by water hoses or sap tubing running along the surface of the ground. Several other mobile homes to the northeast of the Benjamin property in 1991 and 1992 lacked a functioning water supply or experienced freezing of their water supply, resulting in the occupants' experiencing actual public health harm. Wells #3 and 4 are permanently connected by a water line. They serve the Henry house and barn, the Thornton mobile home, the gold house, and the two mobile homes located on Greenwoods Road. As of November 2, 1993 and from time to time since 1988, Wells #1 and #2 are connected to Wells #3 and 4, either by a water line running "underneath" the houses and connected by a "gate valve" or by a temporary water line or hose running across the surface of the ground. As of November 2, 1993, the water system served a total of 13 service connections and 37 individuals year-round, as follows: 14 individuals in the six mobile homes in the cluster; Henry (6); gold house(McCormick) (1); Maskell (2); Barratt/Comstock (5); LaFarr(R. Marchant) (5); Callahan (2); and Hakey (2). As of October 24, 1994, the water system served at total of 13 service connections and 31 individuals year-round. Wells 1 & 2 served 9 service connections serving 21 people: the five mobile homes remaining in the cluster (Commo (3), A. Commo (1), Buttles (3), Anderson (1), and Wheeler (1)), the two mobile homes on the east side of Henry Road (N. Marchant (3) and Barratt/Comstock (5)), Hakey (2) and Maskell (2). Wells 3 & 4 served 5 service connections serving 10 people: Callahan (0); LaFarr(R. Marchant) (2); gold house (McCormick) (1); Thornton (3); and Henry (4). Respondents have not applied for approval of the water system under 10 V.S.A. Chapter 56. The water system sources are not approved under the state water supply regulations, the isolation zones do not comply with the state water supply regulations, the storage and disinfection capacity for the system do not comply with the state water supply regulations, the distribution piping for the system does not comply with the state water supply regulations, and the water pressure in the system on June 30, 1994 was 32 pounds per square inch, below that required by the state water supply regulations. Respondent Leo Henry operates the water supply system, but is not certified as an operator under the state water supply regulations. Potential harm to public health and the environment has resulted from the construction and operation of the water system. Even if no actual contamination of the water system has occurred, the construction and operation of the water system has exposed the users of the system to the potential for contamination by bacteria and viruses, as well as chemicals such as nitrates, pesticides and herbicides entering the water system from livestock, fertilizer, agricultural practices and the septic systems on Respondents' property. The mobile home within 25 feet of Well #2 and its associated vehicles could leak petroleum products into the system. The water system does not have sufficient storage and therefore it would also lack adequate contact time for disinfection of the water if the water system had a disinfection component. Without a certified operator and without periodic water testing, the occurrence of contamination is less likely to be identified. As of December 19, 1994, five households remained in the cluster of mobile homes: Louise Anderson, Ernest Wheeler, Allen Commo, Leonard and Alice Commo and their grandson, and Clyde Buttles, Judy Therrien and her son. These households are the present members of the Greenwoods Tenants' Association (GTA). Because the Amended Administrative Order does not seek to impose eviction of the tenants as a remedy in this case, we need not make findings on the specific harm to the present members of GTA if they were required to leave Respondents' property. Several of the present members of GTA are elderly, in poor health or both. The present members of GTA want to remain in their mobile homes renting lots from Respondents; either their health would be harmed if they had to move or their mobile homes cannot be moved or would not be accepted into another mobile home park. They rely on their neighbors for help in daily living and feel that the Henrys have been good landlords. The present tenants who testified spoke highly of Respondents, stressing the diligent manner in which their concerns were responded to. The present tenants of the cluster have not reported seeing surfacing effluent and have not reported any actual problems with their drinking water or other unhealthful or dangerous conditions. Some prior tenants were without water and wastewater removal and observed surfacing sewage in 1991 and 1992. Until November 1, 1994, the rent for each lot was $100 per month; as of that date the rent was raised to $125 per month. These rental amounts are substantially below the statewide average of $200-250 per month. On August 11, 1993, this court issued an emergency order, based on the parties' stipulation and agreement. Respondents were present in court during the hearing and authorized their attorney to sign the stipulation to entry of the emergency order on their behalf. The emergency order was also served on Respondents on July 16, 1994. The emergency order required, among other things, that Respondents not allow any new or substitute residents to occupy any mobile home, except for one farm worker and his or her family in the northeasternmost mobile home; that Respondents not engage in any new construction; that Respondents take water samples monthly and have them analyzed for bacteria and nitrates and submit the reports to the Agency, in conformance with Agency procedures; and that Respondents maintain the wastewater disposal systems to prevent the surfacing of sewage and promptly eliminate any surfacing sewage by pumping the waste water. Respondents have not undertaken water testing, except for occasional testing prior to March 1994 as required by the Department of Agriculture. That testing does not in any event conform to the Agency requirements for water testing. The required testing would cost approximately $12 per month. The Secretary advised Respondents' attorney by letter received February 11, 1994, of Respondents' failure to comply with the water testing requirements of the Emergency Order. Robert Marchant, his wife, his daughter Nicole, and her two children lived in the mobile home to the northeast of the Benjamin property from September 1993 through April 1994. From April 1994 through October 24, 1994, and continuing thereafter, Robert Marchant and his wife moved to the LaFarr mobile home on Greenwoods Road, and Nicole and her children continued to live in the mobile home to the northeast of the Benjamin property. Nicole Marchant worked part-time for Respondents painting the old barn and otherwise improving the property. In May 1994 Respondents placed an additional mobile home near Well #2, and connected it to and improved the septic system previously serving the old barn. They connected it to the water system receiving water from wells #3 and #4. They allowed occupancy of it on or about June 22, 1994 by Robert Thornton, his wife and daughter. Mr. Thornton works part-time for Respondents, and rents the mobile home and the old barn for a total of $400 per month, intending to use the old barn to run a repair shop business. We find that $100 of that rental per month was attributable to rental of the mobile home. In early July 1994, Respondents and their attorney were advised by representatives of the Secretary that surfacing sewage was present on Respondents' property. Respondents did not pump the wastewater from the septic tanks. The Lake Champlain Housing Development Corporation (LCHDC) is a non-profit corporation having as a primary purpose to foster affordable housing in its service area which includes Chittenden, Franklin and Grand Isle counties. It has a for-profit subsidiary, LCH Ventures, which manages its projects, including 400 units of affordable housing and two other mobile home parks. It has acted as receiver in another case, and has contracts with architects, engineers, and lawyers to perform its work as needed. It has the capability to perform as a receiver in this case and to implement the remedial requirements of the Amended Administrative Order, and its Board of Directors has approved accepting that responsibility, subject to the availability of funds in an escrow account, should the Court so order. No evidence was presented that Respondents had a history of any other violations prior to the issuance of the first Administrative Order in this matter. On January 14, 1994, this Court issued an Emergency Order requiring Respondent to remove a second mobile home which had been placed in November 1993, on a one-half acre parcel of land he owned in Alburg Springs, without an Act 250 permit or a water supply and wastewater disposal permit. No evidence was presented that Respondent failed to comply with that Emergency Order. Respondents' rental ledger was a more accurate source of information on the rental income received from the mobile homes than were Respondents' tax returns, because Respondents included rental and other income from other properties and farm income in some tax returns. Respondents charged $100 per month for the rental of each mobile home lot. Respondents charged in rents only what they believed to be necessary to cover the ordinary expenses of maintaining the water supply, wastewater disposal and other services to the mobile home lots. From January 1, 1989 through October 24, 1994, Respondents received a rental income from the mobile home lots on Respondents' property of $55,050, broken down by calendar year as follows: In 1989, Respondents received a rental income from mobile home lots on Respondents' property of $5,832. In 1990, Respondents received a rental income from mobile home lots on Respondents' property of $8,675. In 1991, Respondents received a rental income from mobile home lots on Respondents' property of $11,618. In 1992, Respondents received a rental income from mobile home lots on Respondents' property of $9,965. In 1993 through June, Respondents received a rental income from mobile home lots on Respondents' property of $5,360. From July 1993 through October 1994, Respondents received a rental income from mobile home lots on Respondents' property of $12,500, plus $700 from N. Marchant for April through October 1994 and $400 from Thornton for June 22 through October 1994. After November 1, 1994 the rent was raised to $125 per month. Respondents expended $10,000 in payments to engineers towards the work necessary to applying for a mobile home park permit for their property, although no application was filed. Respondents claimed to have spent an additional $10,000, for a total of $20,000, to correct the alleged violations, but did not present evidence from which we can make that finding. We find that Respondents expended amounts for labor and materials to create the mobile home lots, install their septic systems, and to extend the water system. We also find that Respondents expended amounts for labor and materials to improve some of the septic systems and water line connections, and generally for upkeep of the rental lots, but insufficient evidence was presented of those costs or time expended, except that in 1992, from schedule E of Respondents' tax return, we find that they expended $774 on repairs and water system expenses for the rental property. We find that the lost hay crop cannot be attributed as a cost of this case, in that Respondents did not hire anyone to perform haying during their court appearances. The other costs asserted by Respondents involving lost opportunities for land trust participation and for obtaining a tenant for the barn are too speculative. Before January 1, 1989, Respondents did not think of what they were doing as creating a mobile home park. Before June 24, 1991, Respondents did not believe the State would take action against them for creating a mobile home park. Respondents cooperated with the Agency investigators and the Secretary did not produce any evidence indicating that the Respondents acted in a secretive or clandestine manner or in any way misrepresented or gave untruthful responses to the investigators. The Secretary has incurred at least $8,409 in costs of enforcement in this case, as follows: $637 for preparation of exhibits and depositions; $271 for service of subpoenas and orders; $7,501 for the time of the following Agency personnel: Mr. Coyne ($5361), Ms. Wyman ($1,698) and Mr. Pingree ($442), but not including the time of Mr. Dodge, Mr. Sargent or Mr. Green, or that of any attorney. Conclusions as to Violation (10 V.S.A. 8012(c)(1)): The statute requires this Court to determine whether a violation has occurred, 10 V.S.A.  8012(b)(1), independently of reviewing and determining anew a penalty amount. 10 V.S.A.  8012(b)(4). Respondents' property did not contain mobile homes prior to 1970, was not a mobile home park in existence as of June 1, 1970. By placing a second mobile home on their property in 1988, by maintaining more than two mobile homes on the property after the 1990 amendment to 10 V.S.A.  6201(2), Respondents have violated 10 V.S.A.  6321(a) (Mobile Home Parks). Because Respondents are agricultural employers, the violation does not include up to four mobile homes used by full-time workers or employees as a benefit or condition of employment, after May 6, 1994. We conclude that neither Nicole Marchant nor the Thorntons are full-time agricultural workers, and therefore do not come within the exemption. Accordingly, we need not address whether they occupy their respective mobile homes as a benefit or condition of employment. The mobile home park violation began as of January 1, 1989 and continues to the present. By installing, constructing or maintaining at least ten housing units on Respondents' property after June 1, 1970, by constructing improvements of over 800 feet for roads incidental to the lease of lots, and by constructing improvements on roads providing access to more than five lots, Respondents have violated 10 V.S.A.  6081(a) (Act 250). The Act 250 violation began on July 24, 1991 and continues to the present. By operating a water system or combination of water systems owned or controlled by Respondents with at least ten service connections or serving an average of at least 25 individuals for at least 60 days a year, without a public water supply permit, Respondents have violated 10 V.S.A.  1673(c). The public water system violation began prior to July 1, 1991, but will be calculated from July 1, 1991 (when the public water supply program was transferred to the Agency of Natural Resources), and continues to the present. By installing the Thornton mobile home on Respondents' property by June 22, 1994 and connecting it to water supply and wastewater disposal, by failing to pump surfacing sewage and dispose of it off-site in May and June, 1994, and by failing to conduct monthly water tests beginning in August of 1993 in accordance with Agency of Natural Resources standards, Respondents have violated the Emergency Order. We cannot conclude, based on the limited evidence presented on this issue, that the Thorntons' intended commercial use of the barn necessarily constitutes a present violation by Respondents of any additional state permit requirements. Determination of Order and Penalty (10 V.S.A. 8012(c)(3)): Determination of Order Subsections (2) and (3) of 10 V.S.A.  8012(b) give this court authority to affirm, modify or reverse any provision of the Amended Administrative Order except for orders involving remedial work issued under 10 V.S.A.  8008(b)(5), which may only be affirmed or vacated and remanded. Respondents' failure to comply with the stipulated Emergency Order warrant the appointment of a receiver to carry out necessary remedial actions. 10 V.S.A.  8014(a), V.R.C.P. 70. The Amended Administrative Order is largely modified and affirmed as appears in the Order section of this decision, except for Paragraphs E and V of the Amended Administrative Order which are reversed in part because restraints on alienation are disfavored. No provisions ordering remedial work under  8008(b)(5) were modified. Penalty Calculation The Court must review and determine anew an appropriate penalty amount for the violations by applying the eight criteria set forth in 10 V.S.A. 8010(b). 10 V.S.A. 8012(b)(4). Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Duranleau, 3 Vt. L. Week 255 (1992); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick, Docket No. 94-057, Vt. Supreme Ct. (October 21, 1994). While some actual public health harm has resulted from these violations in the mobile homes to the northeast of the Benjamins' property in 1991 and 1992, the more serious concern is the serious potential for public health and safety harm and environmental groundwater harm resulting from these violations, especially the potential for contamination of the groundwater and water supply resulting from improper construction of the water system and the sewer systems.  8010(b)(1). Moreover, even if actual (as opposed to potential) harm to the public health, safety, welfare and the environment was relatively slight, the length of time during which the violations existed was relatively long. 8010(b)(1) and (b)(8). Respondents offer in mitigation that they did not intend the violations originally, and that they charge a below-market rent for tenants who may have no alternative affordable housing, that is, that Respondents were "only trying to help people out." Respondents' good intentions are borne out by the testimony of at least their current tenants. However, Vermont requires even non-profit charitable organizations to comply with the minimum regulations protecting human health and the environment. The State does not allow an organization serving meals to the homeless to serve unhealthful food or allow a shelter for battered families to provide sleeping rooms without adequate fire exits, just because the services are provided as a charity. It is also important to the "even-handed enforcement" of Vermont's environmental laws (10 V.S.A.  8001(3)), that all developers of mobile home parks and residential subdivisions and persons operating public water systems be required to recognize that it is necessary to comply fully with the statutory requirements to obtain a permit, or to contest the need for a permit, prior to putting the system into operation or renting the mobile home lots. Respondents did not appeal the jurisdictional decisions bringing them within these programs. Respondents also argue that the period between September 1988 (the inspection by Mr. Dodge) and July 1991 (the issuance of the first NOAV) is unreasonable delay on the part of the Secretary in taking enforcement action, which is a factor in determining the penalty under the statute. 8010(b)(2). We cannot conclude that any portions of the Secretary's delay in issuing the order were unreasonable under the circumstances of this case, especially considering that the statutory authority to issue an administrative order did not accrue to the Secretary until November of 1990 and the first NOAV was issued only six months later. Most importantly, the need to deter disregard of the requirements of the law (8010(b)(6)) requires the imposition of a monetary penalty for Respondent's failure to comply with Vermont's environmental permit programs, even without lasting environmental or public harm. State Agency of Natural Resources v. Riendeau, 157 Vt. 615, 622 (1991). Vermont's environmental permit programs cannot function if persons subject to the programs make unilateral decisions to disregard them. See, e.g., State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Gates, No. E91-030 (Vt. Envtl. Ct., January 8, 1992); Secretary v. Handy Family Enterprises, No. E92-022 (Vt. Envtl. Ct., June 14, 1993); Secretary v. Godnick, No. E92-081 (Vt. Envtl. Ct., December 30, 1993). From at least July of 1991, if not the fall of 1988, Respondents and their attorney were clearly on notice of the existence of the violations. 8010(b)(3). Certainly they were on notice from the first Administrative Order in May of 1993, and the Emergency Order they stipulated to in August of 1993. They could not disregard the violations by referring them to their engineers or attorneys. Notice to an attorney is presumed to be notice to the client, Brown v. Evarts, 128 Vt. 1, 7 (1969) and the actions or failure to act of an attorney are ordinarily attributable to the client. Scully v. Schubert, 155 Vt. 327, 331 (1990), citing Haskins v. Estate of Haskins, 113 Vt. 466, 471 (1944). The duration of the mobile home park violation is approximately six years, calculated from January 1, 1989. 8010(b)(8). The penalties provided in 10 V.S.A. Chapter 201 may be applied to violations which occurred prior to the effective date of the Uniform Environmental Enforcement Act. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick, Docket No. 94-057, Vt. Supreme Ct. (October 21, 1994). The duration of the Act 250 violation is approximately three and a half years, calculated from July 24, 1991. The duration of the public water system violation is also approximately three and a half years, calculated from July 1, 1991. Respondents received an economic benefit from this violation in at least the rental amounts received from the rented lots during the period of violation, which is the best and fairest measure of this component of economic benefit in this case. 8010(b)(5). As of October 24, 1994, and have continued to receive an economic benefit of $125 per lot per month for each of at least eight lots, or $1,000 per month for the months of November and December 1994 and January and February 1995. For the period for which the penalty is assessed, this component of the penalty is $59,050. There was no evidence that Respondents received any income from the users of the water system for that service. Another component of economic benefit accruing to Respondents from this violation was the outlay Respondent saved during the period of violation by declining to perform testing, submit engineering work, or make what improvements may be required under the three permit programs. The Court would ordinarily assess an additional penalty attributable to these avoided and delayed costs, but insufficient evidence was presented on which to base this component of the penalty, except for $12 per month for the water testing for the 42 months of violation, or $504. Accordingly, Respondents' economic benefit due to these violations is $59,554. The more than $10,000 they expended towards qualifying for a permit may be evidence of Respondents' efforts to comply, 8010(b)(4), but it does not reduce the economic benefit of the violation as the lots should not have been rented out and providing an income before the mobile home park permit had been obtained. The Secretary's actual costs of enforcement were $8,409. 8010(b)(7). The Court finds that an additional penalty beyond the removal of economic benefit is required for deterrence to prevent future violations, because Respondents have not complied even with the Emergency Order which they stipulated to in August of 1993. 10 V.S.A.  8010(b)(6). The Court also finds that the long duration of the violations warrants a penalty above the removal of economic benefit. 8010(b)(8). Therefore, we will impose an additional penalty amount of $15,000 on account of these two factors. Taking all these factors into account, the Court will impose a penalty of $83,963 for this violation, which is to be placed in the escrow account created by the Order. Any portion of this penalty not used by the Receiver over the course of the Receivership shall be paid to the State of Vermont pursuant to 10 V.S.A.  8010(e) at the conclusion of the Receivership. ORDER Based on the findings, conclusions, and reasoning of this decision, it is hereby ORDERED that the Amended Administrative Order is modified, and as modified, is affirmed, as follows, except for Paragraphs E and V, which are reversed in part. It was necessary for the Court to restate the Order as modified to minimize confusion. Respondents' duties and responsibilities A. Nothing in this Order shall relieve Respondents from any responsibilities they may have under Vermont's environmental, health, or residential rental housing laws or regulations. Nothing in this Order shall prevent Respondents from making application to any Agency for any permits, including permits under Act 250, the Mobile Home Park law, and the Public Water Supply law, either alone or in cooperation with the Receiver appointed under Paragraph F of this Order. B. (former B, L & M) Until all permits required for Respondents' property have been obtained, Respondents, and their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who have actual notice of this order, shall not rent, offer for rent, construct or install or allow occupancy of any additional mobile home, mobile home lot, or dwelling unit on Respondents' property or any which is vacant or unoccupied or becomes vacant or unoccupied, except for up to four mobile homes qualifying for the full-time agricultural worker exemption found in 10 V.S.A.  6201(2). Respondents shall not reconfigure any mobile home lot, except as required by Paragraph C of this Order or by further Order of the Court. C. (former K & L) Respondents may allow the following tenants and their children or grandchildren residing with them as of the date of the Order to remain in mobile homes on Respondents' property until they vacate, provided that they pay rent as required by this Order: Ernest Wheeler, Louise Anderson, Allen Commo, Leonard and Alice Commo (and Christopher Scott), Clyde Buttles, Judy Therrien, Arnold Barratt, Lori Comstock, and Robert and Cecile Marchant (on the LaFarr lot). Other than those tenants, Respondents, and the current residents of the gold house, Respondents shall not allow any other persons except for persons residing in up to four mobile homes qualifying for the full-time agricultural worker exemption found in 10 V.S.A.  6201(2) to reside on Respondents' property. Within 15 days of this Order, Respondents shall file with the Court, with copies to LCHDC and to the parties, a list of the persons residing on their property, each person's status under this Paragraph, rental amounts and any written leases as of the date of this Order. Within thirty days of this Order, Respondents shall move the Thornton mobile home to a temporary location if required by and approved in advance by the Enforcement Division of the Agency of Environmental Conservation, in order to minimize the risk it poses to Well #2 and the other water sources on Respondents' property pending Respondents' compliance with the remainder of this Paragraph. Respondents shall cause any persons now residing on Respondents' property who are neither listed in the first two sentences of this paragraph nor qualified under the agricultural worker exemption of 10 V.S.A.  6201(2) to vacate the premises as soon as possible consistent with Vermont's Residential Rental Housing laws, and shall promptly cause the removal of any vacated mobile homes from Respondents' property. Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any resident of Respondents' property from receiving the services of home health workers or from caring for foster minor children as approved by the State. D. (former E & V) Respondents shall not sell or offer for sale any portion of Respondents' property, without 30 days prior notice to the parties of such intended action. Based on such notice or for any other reason, any party may file with the Court any appropriate motion to modify this order. E. (former G & H) Respondents, and their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who have actual notice of this order, shall not interfere with the activities of the Receiver and in particular with the Receiver's operation of the water system and the septic systems of the mobile homes, and shall pay to the receiver any rents they may receive from any mobile home tenant on their property. Nothing in this order requires Respondents to pay to the receiver any moneys they receive from any other property or from the owners of the lots conveyed out of this property. Appointment of Receiver; Receiver's duties and responsibilities F. (former D) The Court, having found that Respondents failed to comply with the Emergency Order, despite their having entered into it by stipulation, hereby appoints the Lake Champlain Housing Development Corporation as Receiver under V.R.C.P. 70 with authority until further order of the Court. The Receiver: (1) shall notify the mobile home tenants that it has been appointed and is authorized by the Court to collect their rental payments on behalf of Respondents; (2) shall establish an escrow account for the funds to be managed by the Receiver under this Order, including the penalty imposed under paragraph N of this Order, (3) shall establish rental amounts in conformance with the rental housing laws of the state of Vermont, and shall collect from the mobile home tenants and deposit into the escrow account on behalf of Respondents all present and future rental payments. Nothing in this subparagraph prevents the members of the GTA from retaining and managing the escrow fund previously established by agreement with Respondents to cover some of GTA's expert witnesses, (4) shall manage and operate the mobile homes on Respondents' property, and the water system on Respondents' property, to the extent that funds are available in the escrow account, in conformance with this Order to assure the health, safety and welfare of the residents and of the environment, and to employ persons, maintain or obtain insurance, and do other acts as reasonable and necessary to carry out its responsibilities; (5) may enter upon Respondents' property between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. upon 24 hours oral or written notice to Respondents and to any affected resident, except that in the event of imminent danger to any person or property entry is allowed at any necessary hour and without prior notice. Within 24 hours after such emergency entry, the Receiver shall file a written explanation of the emergency entry with the Court, with copies to the Town Health Officer, to Respondents and to any affected resident; (6) may pay from the escrow account, in the following order of priority, and to the extent that funds are available in the escrow account, (a) the reasonable and necessary actual costs of the Receiver's management of Respondents' property, including any liability insurance beyond its existing liability insurance necessary to be held by the Receiver on account of this project; (b) reasonable and necessary repairs to and maintenance of the water supply system serving Respondents' property; (c) the erection and maintenance of reasonable and necessary fencing around areas of surfacing sewage; (d) utility services for the mobile home tenants, unless any such tenant pays his or her utility services directly; (e) reasonable and necessary repairs to any maintenance of the wastewater disposal systems serving the mobile homes, which may include any reasonable and necessary pumping and hauling of sewage from septic systems serving the mobile homes to an approved disposal facility; (f) the reasonable and necessary operation and maintenance of the mobile home lots and services to those lots on Respondents' property. G. (former J) Paragraph F shall remain in effect until further order of the Court. Respondents may apply for an order vacating Paragraph F on the grounds that they have obtained all state permits required for Respondents' property and are able to operate Respondents' property in compliance with all such permits, or that the tenants identified in the first sentence of paragraph C have vacated Respondents' property and their mobile homes have been moved from Respondents' property. H. (former X) The Receiver shall file a quarterly accounting with Plaintiff and with Respondents setting forth all deposits to and disbursements from the escrow account. At any time at which it becomes apparent to the Receiver that insufficient funds are contained in the escrow account to allow it to carry out all its responsibilities under this Order, it may file a petition with the Court, with copies to the parties, to modify this Order to require Respondents to provide additional funds. Water system improvements I. (former Q) The Receiver shall use its best efforts, subject to the availability of escrow funds, to assure that each user of the water system is provided with a continuous supply of safe drinking water. Should the water supply on Respondents' property fall below the drinking water standards so as to become undrinkable, the Receiver shall arrange for the provision of an alternative water source, such as bottled water or a water tank truck. J. (former R) The Receiver shall sample monthly for total coliform bacteria and for nitrates, according to the Agency-approved sampling, testing, care of samples and analysis procedures, and shall have the samples analyzed at an Agency-approved laboratory, and shall submit the results to the Water Supply Division of the Agency within two weeks of the date of sampling. Within 30 days of the date of this Order the Receiver shall submit a sampling plan and the procedures it plans to follow to the Water Supply Division of the Agency for approval. K. (former O & P) Within 15 days from the date on which sufficient escrow funds are available in the escrow account for this purpose, the Receiver shall retain a Vermont registered professional engineer competent in water supply system design and maintenance to perform the following evaluation of the water system on Respondents' property. Within 60 days from the date on which the engineer is retained, the Receiver shall submit to the Water Supply Division of the Agency for approval the engineer's report documenting a thorough evaluation of the existing water system and recommending improvements to the system to help assure that it will provide continuous safe drinking water for all the users of the system. The engineer's report shall include: 1) results of an inspection of Well #2 and the engineer's certification that it is a bedrock well, properly cased, grouted and covered; 2) result of an inspection of the pump controls and pressurization system(s) for the water system and recommendation for repairs and improvements which are reasonably necessary to provide a continuous supply of safe drinking water; 3) recommendations as to (a) whether the primary well(s) shall be located in a heated structure with the well casing terminating at least 18" above grade, (b) the installation and continuous operation of a chlorination system on the water supply complying with the applicable regulations; (c) the grading of the ground around the primary well to direct surface water away from the well; (d) the permanent disconnection of cross-connections between Wells #1 & #2, on the one hand, and Wells #3 & #4 on the other; and (e) the appropriate protection of the areas around Well #2, including whether the old barn and an area for a radius of 200' around Well #2 shall not be used for animals, parking or storage of vehicles or equipment, or storage of potential contaminants. The Agency shall rule promptly on the engineer's report and shall promptly advise the engineer, the Receiver and the parties whether requirements additional to the engineer's report will be sought by the Agency. If the parties disagree on the approval conditions, they shall make a good faith attempt to resolve their differences and shall consider mediation before bringing the matter to the attention of this Court. Within 90 days of the issuance of the approval letter, as seasonal conditions allow and if escrow funds are available, the Receiver shall implement the recommendations in the approved engineer's report. Thereafter, the Receiver or Respondents may apply for certification of the water system as a public water system. Wastewater disposal systems L. (former S) The Receiver shall, subject to the availability of escrow funds, assure the proper and continuing functioning of the wastewater disposal systems currently serving the mobile homes on Respondents' property, including consideration of the following steps as may be necessary: (1) Installation of water saving devices in any mobile home except those exempt under 10 V.S.A.  6201(2); (2) Annual or more frequent pumping of any septic tank and provision of documentation of such pumping to the Enforcement Division of the Agency (3) Drainage of any mobile home lot exhibiting surface water accumulation; and (4) Addition of soil above the leachfields to prevent seasonal surfacing of effluent If any of the septic systems serving the mobile homes should fail, as evidenced by surfacing sewage, the Receiver shall have replacement fields designed by a Vermont-registered professional engineer and installed under the engineer's supervision, within 45 days of the failure, seasonal conditions and escrow funds permitting. Any such replacement fields shall be designed and constructed, in the professional judgment of the engineer, to represent the best possible solution given the site conditions and the funds available. Application under Act 250 M. (former T) Within 60 days of the issuance of this Order, Respondents shall either have file a complete application and actively pursue obtaining a permit under Act 250 for operation of their property with more than ten dwelling units, or shall apply under Act 250 to reduce the number of dwelling units below ten. They may seek any declaratory ruling or advisory opinion from the Act 250 program regarding the jurisdiction of Act 250 over their property. Unless a further order of this Court releases any part of the penalty or escrow fund for such purpose, Respondents and not the Receiver shall be responsible for the costs of compliance with any conditions of an Act 250 permit if one should be issued. Penalty N. (former U and X) Paragraph U of the Amended Administrative Order is vacated. On or before April 10, 1994, Respondent shall pay a penalty of $83,963 to the State of Vermont, which shall be deposited to the escrow fund established in paragraph F of this Order. Any portion of the penalty not expended under this Order at the close of the receivership shall be made payable by the Receiver to the State of Vermont and forwarded to the Enforcement Division, One South, 103 South Main Street, Waterbury, Vermont 05671-0401 to be deposited in the general fund pursuant to 10 V.S.A. 8010(e). Rights of Appeal (10 V.S.A. 8012(c)(4) and (5)): WARNING: this decision will become final if no appeal is requested within 10 days of receipt of this decision. Respondents and the Secretary of the Agency of Natural Resources have a right to appeal this decision. The procedures for requesting an appeal are found in the Vermont Rules of Appellate Procedure (V.R.A.P.) subject to the exceptions in Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure (V.R.C.P.) 76(a)(3) and (d)(5). Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, any party seeking to file an appeal must file the notice of appeal with the Clerk of this Court, together with the applicable filing fee. Questions may be addressed to the Clerk of the Vermont Supreme Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, VT 05609-0801, (802) 828-3276. An appeal to the Supreme Court operates as a stay of payment of a penalty, but does not stay any other aspect of an order issued by this Court. 10 V.S.A. 8013(d). A party may petition the Supreme Court for a stay under the provisions of V.R.C.P. 62 and V.R.A.P. 8. Done at Montpelier, Vermont, this 10th day of February, 1995. ____________________________ Merideth Wright Environmental Judge FN1. The jurisdiction of the mobile home park statute as of June 1, 1970 was triggered by "two or more" mobile homes, 10 V.S.A.  6201(2), until a 1990 amendment changed it to "more than two." (Act No. 235, 1989 (Adj. Sess.)) FN2. Although Respondents stated in their answer to a request to admit that there were five mobile homes on Respondents' property in 1978, the Secretary requested a finding that she had proved "conclusively" that only one mobile home existed on Respondents' property prior to 1987.