NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 88-336
 
 
Donna (Christopher) Bradley                  Supreme Court
 
          v.                                 On Appeal from
                                             Chittenden Superior Court
Joel D. Bradley
                                             February Term, 1990

 
Matthew I. Katz, J.

Donna H. Christopher (Bradley), pro se, Burlington, plaintiff-appellee
 
Blodgett, Watts & Volk, Burlington, for defendant-appellant
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.
 
 
     MORSE, J.  At issue in this appeal is the power of the court to modify
the amount of child support when the parties agreed that child support would
extend beyond the period set by 15 V.S.A. { 658(c) ("court may order support
to be continued until the child attains the age of majority or terminates
secondary education whichever is later") (formerly { 651(d)).  We affirm.
     The court granted the parties an uncontested divorce in 1983.  A
written stipulation to all terms of the divorce was incorporated in the
divorce judgment, including monthly payments of $600 to be divided equally
for the support of their two children "until they reach the age of 21."  The
parties waived separate maintenance.  In 1987, the court approved
plaintiff's request to increase child support and denied defendant's request
that child support cease when the children reached eighteen, holding that at
eighteen, the 1983 provision on child support would govern.
     The defendant agreed at the time of the divorce to be bound by a court
order to pay child support after the period provided by statute.  Defendant
maintains, however, that plaintiff "rescinded" the agreement when she sought
increased pre-majority child support and it was error for the court to
extend support in any amount beyond eighteen.  Premised on this assertion,
he argues he has been deprived of the benefit of the bargain when the court
raised the amount of child support until age eighteen because he had
bargained for a reduced child support amount in exchange for extending
child support payments beyond the statutory period until age twenty-one.  In
essence, defendant says plaintiff cannot have it both ways -- increased
support and extended support.
     We agree with defendant up to a point.  When parties stipulate that
child support extend beyond the age of majority, a court may not ordinarily
modify that agreement "upon a showing of a real, substantial and
unanticipated change in circumstances."  15 V.S.A. { 660(a).  But that is
not what happened here.  The court left intact the parties' stipulation on
past-age-of-majority child support.
     Defendant's argument is unavailing because there is no indication  --
evidenced in the agreement or otherwise -- that the parties intended the
extended support to be a quid pro quo for reduced amounts of support.  For
all we know, defendant's concession to pay child support beyond majority was
gratuitous or an exchange for some consideration other than reduced amounts
of support.
     Moreover, the law presupposes modification of child support regardless
of the motivation of the parties in setting its original amount.  Bucholt v.
Bucholt, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 566 A.2d 409, 411 (1989) ("stipulations as to
child support are always subject . . . to review until the children reach
the age of majority"); White v. White, 141 Vt. 499, 502-03, 450 A.2d 1108,
____ (1982) (parties may not bargain away court's authority to modify child
support order).
     Affirmed.
 
 
                                        FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
                                        __________________________________
                                        Associate Justice